Abstract
U.S. lone-wolf terrorism has grown in the past 20 years
as effective counterterrorism efforts and advances in the internet turn
potential domestic terrorists to adopt lone-wolf terrorism strategies. While the U.S. government and academics have
long spent debating American lone wolf criteria, lone wolves have entirely
adapted to the online environment to facilitate planning and execution of
attacks. U.S. lone-wolf terrorists come from all socioeconomic backgrounds,
including the military. The primary
method of a lone-wolf incident is done with firearms directed towards the
federal government and law enforcement.
While lone-wolves are generally effective in evading detection, there is
an operational security flaw as they balance between secrecy and the need to
publicize their attacks. The internet
revolution has transformed the U.S. domestic terrorist scene to utilize online
communities to keep anonymous and encrypted to avoid detection. While the internet’s freedom is significantly
beneficial to the American economy and political life, the freedom allows a
relatively easy vector of radicalization and planning for lone-wolf terrorists.
_________________________________________________________________________
Introduction
American lone-wolf terrorism has long
been understudied compared to organized terrorist groups due to being
overshadowed by organized terror to conduct more brutal attacks and higher
public visibility. The United States has
identified that the threat of lone-wolf terrorism is the most significant
national security threat facing the county (MacInnis, 2011). Effective counterterrorism strategies have
made organizational affiliation increasingly onerous for terrorists; lone-wolf
terrorism has become an enticing strategy against the United States and its
allies that rely on technology to increase effectiveness, lethality, and
organizational methods. Understanding American lone wolf terrorism sheds light
on the evolution and adaption of this strategy. Exploring the efficacy of
modern lone-wolf terrorism sheds light on the potential future viability of the
strategy. The world appears to be facing a new wave of terrorism that is
centralized by lone-wolf strategies as traditional organizational methods fall
out of favor embracing the anonymity afforded by the internet. Lone-wolves in
today’s world regains prominence in a digital world where information to
strategize, target, and publicize is easily at one’s fingertips to a global
audience.
History
of U.S. Lone Wolf Terrorism
The
United States is no stranger to lone-wolf terrorists throughout its history,
characterized by lone political assassins, anarchists, anti-government, and
religious individuals to produce political change through violence from
President Garfield's assassination 1881 to the Orlando nightclub shooting in
2016 (Simon, 2011). A host of lone-wolf actors from political dissents,
anarchists, radical environmentalists, racial supremacists, and religious
extremists have left their mark on American history and trying to influence the
nation's political future. Each incident
within the United States has prompted a response to increase security measures
and awareness of various political issues. What distinguishes early U.S. lone
wolf terrorism to modern lone-wolves stems from developments within white
supremacists groups in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s.
Modern
manifestations of US lone-wolf terrorism have formalized the idea of a
"leaderless resistance" by white supremacist Louis Beam, during the 1980s
to blunt law enforcement efforts against white supremacist groups (Simon,
2011). Beam utilized the term "lone wolves" in the popular lexicon
that advocated organization in five or fewer cells with independent thinking
and self-directed, which found widespread adoption across all ideologies such
as environmental and Islamic extremists action (Berger, 2019; Simon, 2011;
Smith, 2020). The concept of leaderless
resistance from all ideologies during the 1990s and 2000s invited government
crackdown coupled with unambitious planning bound in failure exemplified by
Naser Abdo and others (Berger, 2019). Revival
in the leaderless resistance concept came as internet technology matured to
sustain open-source social media fuel social connections like-minded individuals
for all ideologies to leverage utilization (Berger, 2019; Gartenstein-Ross,
& Barr, 2016; Hunter, et al., 2020). American lone-wolf terrorism history
remains grounded in conducting most of their acts by using firearms or bombs
despite the advances in technology that allows for more careful planning (Alfaro-Gonzalez,
et al., 2015). The combination of technology and firearms is a continued
hallmark theme in modern lone-wolf terrorism.
Challenge
of Defining Lone Wolf Terrorism
U.S.
lone wolf terrorism studies' history is complicated by the definitional dilemma
brought about by governmental and academic sources. Terrorism studies have primarily focused on
organized terrorist groups, rightfully so, since group-initiated attacks are
the predominant incidents within the United States. According to the University of Maryland
Global Terrorism database (2019), there have been about 7,500 terrorist attacks
that have taken place within the United States; Hamm and Spaaij (2017) reveal
115 cases of authentic lone-wolf incidents.
Some researchers challenge the notion of actual lone wolves like Ted
Kaczynski as a far rarer phenomenon and that most lone-wolf actors have some
form of social ties, as seen with definitions accommodating affiliation ties to
terrorist organizations and receiving assistance (Schuurman, et al., 2019). The
question of how socially isolated lone-wolves appear to some as woefully
overstated and that external social influences encourage and justify violence
for political means. This challenge
influences the criteria of U.S. lone-wolve incidents under research examination
as Hamm and Spaaij (2017) adopted a stringent definition of lone-wolves acting
alone with no significant external help as their basis of incidents. Others,
such as Simon (2011), include small groups and critical external assistance as
part of his criteria.
The
U.S. government has grappled with defining lone-wolf terrorism, especially in
the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The FBI changed its definition of terrorism
from one year to the next as it tried to decide if a single individual should
be considered a terrorist between 1994 to 1999 (Simon, 2011). A 2009 DHS report
that ‘lone wolves and small terrorist cells embracing violent rightwing
extremist ideology are the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the
United States (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017).’ Despite this concern, Hamm and Spaaij
(2017) write that the FBI, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) do not have public reports that address the growing threat
concerns about lone-wolf terrorism. In
2019, the FBI did publish their first public assessment of lone wolves under
their ‘Lone Offenders’ report that defined a lone-wolf terrorist as a primary
actor that is the primary planner and attacker that may have an affiliation to
a terrorist organization and received assistance (Richards, et al., 2019). The FBI definition is slightly looser than
the strict definition from Hamm and Spaaij (2017), although both agree that the
attacker's act is done primarily alone (Richards, et al., 2019). While the government has struggled to define
lone-wolf terrorists until very recently to help ground the understanding and
criteria of approaches to U.S. lone-wolf terrorism.
Lone
Wolf Strategy
The
lone-wolf terrorist, as contemporarily defined, is an individual actor who
plots and carries out a terrorist attack with little to no external assistance.
One of the biggest reasons this strategy exists is that it can easily avoid
most existing counterterrorism methods. Shhuurman (2019) notes that lone
offender attacks in the United States are more deadly, possibly due to strong
U.S. counterterrorism capacity for disrupting attacks from cells and
organizations. There are similarities
between lone-wolves and organized terrorist groups in terms of tactics,
motivations, and objectives. Regardless
of terrorism strategy, lone-wolves are like any other terrorist that seeks to
promote political or religious change through violence (Simon, 2011). A lone-wolve ability to avoid detection and
maintain animosity makes it incredibly tough to predict and prevent attacks
from such actors while supporting maximum creativity and innovation that group
organization would possibly restrain (Simon, 2011). The only person concerned with execution and
planning is oneself. The themes behind lone-wolf incidents are extensive from
anti-government, religion, race, pro-life, anti-law enforcement, sexual
orientation, and anti-capitalism and environmental rights (Richard, et al., 2019).
Assessing
Effectiveness of Lone Wolf Attacks
Hamm
and Spaaji (2017) point out that lone-wolf terrorism lethality has been
climbing every decade since the 1990s, which is, in turn, is influencing
government and societal response to such incidents. Hamm and Spaaji (2017) point out that
lone-wolf terrorism lethality has been climbing every decade since the 1990s,
which is, in turn, is influencing government and societal response to such
incidents. The predominant use of
firearms in U.S. lone-wolf incidents has sparked national discussions on gun
control, mental health, and political discourse's civil limits
(Alfaro-Gonzalez, et al., 2015; Hamm & Spaaji, 2017; Richards, et al.,
2019). 69 percent of lone wolves owned
legally purchased firearms utilized in their attacks and 35 percent had formal
firearms training (Richards, et al., 2019).
The attraction of using guns for U.S. lone-wolf terrorist incidents is
postulated in the tightening of explosives regulation in the wake of the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing combined with the continued easy to obtain gun laws (Hamm
& Spaaji, 2017; Simon, 2011). As
most U.S. lone-wolf incidents are being carried out with a legally purchased
gun, a disturbing trend exhibited in this form of terrorism complicates
potential gun law reforms that could potentially reduce lone-wolf incidents.
Gill
and Corner (2016) note that there is little difference between those that plot
against the general public versus high-value targets in 111 incidents; however,
a significant finding was that information leakage of intent to harm greatly
increased when targeting the public.
Richards (2019) points out that lone wolves tend to target low-security
areas 52 percent of the time. However, Gill & Corner’s (2016) research
disputes that despite targeting high-value targets, more human capital,
technical expertise, and planning should require more human capital and
planning since lone-wolves displayed the same traits regardless of the target
selected. The predominant targeting for
American lone-wolf terrorists is federal government facilities and personnel
and law enforcement personnel at around 30%
(Richards, et al., 2019; Hamm & Spaaji, 2017). Overall, targeting selection for lone-wolves
is incredibly broad that is familiar with organized terrorism to act by
bombing, hijacking, assassinations, kidnappings, armed assaults, and
hostage-taking.
Attraction
to Lone Wolf Strategy
US
homegrown terrorists come from diverse educational, socioeconomic, ethnic, and
family backgrounds that defy profiling.
It is impossible to build a demographic profile on U.S. lone wolves as a
vast array of factors that drive individuals to violence, making it very
difficult to conduct threat analysis (Alfaro-Gonzalez, et al., 2015). Jeffery
Simon (2011) defines five categories of lone-wolves: 1) secular, 2) religious,
3) single-issue (abortion, environmental), 4) criminal and 5)
idiosyncratic. There are no ideological
limitations to becoming a lone-wolf terrorist, the very ease of adopting a
singular actor terrorist is appealing to many. The 2019 FBI report details that
U.S. lone wolves come from all backgrounds, with 75 percent having some form of
college education (Richards, et al., 2019).
Disturbingly, 37 percent of lone-wolf terrorists have served in the
military, particularly the army at 53 percent (Richards, et al., 2019). An American lone-wolf terrorist can be
college-educated, from a military background, a religious background, and many
others. The concern is that such a view
makes the assessment of U.S. lone wolves incredibly difficult to manage because
it paints that anyone can be a terrorist.
The
U.S. Government's inability to define and act an incoherent matter against lone
wolves provides additional attractiveness to adopting a strategy of lone-wolf
terrorism. The U.S. federal government has approached lone-wolf terrorism in a
scattered response, mainly to combat Islamic extremism with programs that focus
on prevention and a community-based approach (Alfaro-Gonzalez, 2015). The U.S government has no centralized task
force that directly deals with lone-wolves, unlike internal efforts against
organized terrorism (Alfaro-Gonzalez, 2015). The absence of centralized
leadership within law enforcement has helped embolden lone-wolf terrorists to
continue plotting and embracing radicalization. American lone-wolves are
somewhat aware of this disconnect between government rhetoric on the threat of
lone-wolf terrorism and actionable policy against lone-wolves has stumbled for
the past decade (Alfaro-Gonzalez, 2015; Hamm & Spaaji, 2017). While government ineptitude is not a primary
driving factor towards attraction, it is a secondary concern that influences
those that are considering adopting a lone-wolf strategy over joining a group.
Flaws
of Lone Wolf Strategy
Lone-wolf
terrorists are prone to mismanaging their operational security that exposes
intent before an event that potentially thwarts them if acted on early. Eighty-three percent of lone wolves exhibit
previous hostile or aggressive behavior, and 96 percent produce writings or
videos intended to be viewed by others (Richards, et al., 2019). Lone wolves
have some level of social contact with family members or peers, in which 25
percent of the time, at least one bystander knew about research, planning, or
preparation for an attack (Richards, et al., 2019). As part of an attack, the need for publicity
is challenging, keeping planning an attack a secret in about 85% of incidents
(Hamm & Spaaij, 2017). Alfaro-Gonzalez (2015) analyzes that U.S. law
enforcement needs to adopt more community-based approaches to defeating
lone-wolves since most lone-wolves inform close relatives or friends during the
radicalization process. The difficulty
of community-based policing that many bystanders in the community can be
sympathetic to the lone-wolf ideology in question. While community-based approaches is the best
idea available, there is a ceiling of effectiveness if the law enforcement
community cannot make inroads of trust.
The balance between needing publicity and maintaining secrecy is the
main vulnerability in detecting lone-wolves early on. More robust online surveillance and
community-based efforts that can trust law enforcement agencies are the way to
discover these flaws promptly.
Leveraging
Internet Infrastructure in Lone Wolf Terrorism
The
maturity of internet infrastructure and applications has enabled better
utilization of lone-wolf terrorism strategies as the internet has become more
accessible and social media prevalence enables online community creation. Lone-wolves are becoming more innovative and
creative with how to use the internet for terrorism. As seen with the 2019
Christchurch mosque, shootings showcase novel creativity in utilizing social
media live feeding the incident for maximum publicity pre-attack intent
(Hoffman, 2019). Social media is
creating virtual communities of hatred that have become the cornerstone for
online radicalization and planning. A new generation has become comfortable
with the utility of the internet, as seen with Faisal Shahzad and Major Nidel
Hasan (Post, et al., 2014). The new
generation seeks belonging and significance with online communities that
generate self-radicalization. Terrorist organizations find that decentralized
organizations can be met through the medium of the internet as counterterrorism
strategies have put immense pressure on formal organizational structure. Radicalization and operational planning are
increasingly taking place entirely online, utilizing encrypted applications or
social media that challenge existing counterterrorism strategies better to
avoid detection (Gartenstein-Ross & Barr, 2016).
There
is a correlation between greater internet connectivity within democracies,
notably with less wealthy and weak democracies, and domestic terrorism that
amplify preexisting political, societal, and economic tensions (Hunter, et al.,
2019). Hunter (2019) notes that more access to the internet is not the primary
cause of domestic terrorism; however, greater internet access increases
potential radicalization, intensify existing tensions, more opportunity to
recruit, and the avenue of self-radicalization.
Digital infrastructure is more robust within democracies defined by social
media and end-to-end encryption platforms. The internet challenges traditional ways
of radicalization and operational planning no longer apply in a digital world
where individuals and networks can gather online to conduct all their
activities without physically meeting.
The freedom of information that the internet affords, while largely
beneficial, has negative consequences as the primer avenue of lone-wolf
radicalization in democracies.
Louis
Beam’s idea to utilize the internet for radicalization, planning, and executing
lone-wolf terrorists was ahead of his time.
The internet needed to become more mature, more robust, and more
accessible to become the convenient platform today for lone-wolf
terrorists. The new organization model
of terrorism is increasingly dominated by lone-wolf actors communicating online
(Gartenstein-Ross & Barr, 2016). The maturity of the internet and social
media has allowed lone-wolves to adapt to the internet as part of their
strategy to achieve bigger goals (Berger, 2019). While white supremacists were
the early movers and adopters of leveraging the internet to facilitate their
means to an end, every lone-wolf of any ideology can take it and run with the
basic playbook Louis Beam laid out nearly 30 years ago. The United States has seen the results of
Beam’s writings as religious extremists, radical environmentalists, anarchists,
and more have seen the value of the internet for their purpose as much as Beam
saw the internet’s potential back in 1992.
Conclusion
American lone-wolf terrorism is a complex issue that the
internet has empowered as a means to escape the purview of law enforcement and
counterterrorism agencies. While modern
American lone-wolf terrorism is rooted in white supremacist groups, any ideology
seeking political change within the United States has adopted the idea of
leaderless resistance to carry out attacks on American soil. As U.S. counterterrorism efforts have been
increasingly successful against organized terrorism, there has also been increasing
effectiveness of violent lone-wolf attacks that the U.S. government has slowly
realized and act accordingly to the threat.
The significant flaw of lone wolves is their need to publicize their
attacks beforehand despite wanting to keep their planning a secret, which can
be the basis of effective counterterrorism efforts. While American white supremacists were early
to spot the significance of the internet's utility for their actions, their
vision could not be realized until further technological advances made the
internet more robust, faster, and more applications. The internet is here to stay, and so are
lone-wolves gravitating towards online communications and communities to become
the latest wave of homegrown, domestic terrorists.
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