The Negligent Partner of Choice: Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in U.S. Security Sector Assistance

 

The Negligent Partner of Choice:

Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in U.S. Security Sector Assistance

Introduction

U.S. security assistance is one of the core foreign policy tools the U.S. government utilizes to advance its interests abroad, typically touted as an effective means to achieve U.S. national security at a low cost. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Global War on Terrorism has seen a dramatic rise in security assistance aid as billions of dollars, enormous amounts of personnel and military equipment have been handed out to ensure the security of various fragile states to combat terrorism. U.S. security assistance aid in the Global War on Terrorism era has received increased scrutiny after high-profile news of fraud, waste, and abuse in large-scale military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Since those revelations, U.S. policymakers have pivoted to relying more on smaller-scale U.S. security assistance aid in Africa, Syria, and Yemen to control potential blowback. Despite the shift, reports have challenged the claimed effectiveness of U.S. security assistance to acknowledged corrupt regimes, forcing the discussion on the right approach to U.S. security sector assistance.  U.S. security assistance aid is highly susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse that requires enhancing accountability and transparency mechanisms to enhance effectiveness to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

U.S. Security Sector Assistance Landscape

Understanding areas where fraud, waste, and abuse are prevalent in U.S. security assistance requires knowing which U.S. government agencies manage this assistance, the breadth of assistance programs, and how these programs are funded.  Esptein and Rosen (2018) report that from the fiscal year 2006 to 2017, the United States has provided over $200 billion for security assistance and cooperation programs to various foreign countries.  Bergmann and Schmitt (2021) note that the State Department manages traditional overarching authority for security assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Control Act of 1976.  The State Department ran security assistance programs are classified as the Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  The FMF program is the most significant component of U.S. security assistance, as seen in Figure 1 since FMF deals with selling U.S. military hardware and services to other countries.  Until 1980, the Department of Defense's (DOD) primary role in security assistance was implementing those State Department-funded programs.  Incrementally since 1980, the U.S. Congress has authorized DoD with more authority and direct funding under U.S. Code Title 10 (Armed Services) and the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to conduct various security assistance and cooperation activities such as training, equipment, counter-narcotics, and humanitarian assistance in the years leading up to 2001 (Esptein & Rosen, 2018).  U.S. security assistance continued to be a State Department ran operation as DOD prioritized other needs to lead up to Global War on Terrorism. 

Figure 1

U.S. Foreign Assistance, by program – FY 2017

Source: Bearak & Gamio (2016)

In 2005, Congress accelerated DOD's growth in decision-making and management roles for security assistance away from the State Department (Gates, 2010).  Fifty new security assistance programs were created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks; 48 of those programs were authorized to be managed by the DOD, which operated under less transparency and congressional oversight than State Department ran security assistance programs (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  Some specific DOD security assistance programs are Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).  Many of the DOD security assistance programs are tailored to address Global War on Terrorism issues, with several other programs covering great power competition issues dealing with Russia or China. Figure 2 reveals the consistent scope and importance of DOD's direct role in security assistance through funding appropriations, reflecting the emphasis on combatting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency from 2006 to 2017 (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021; Esptein & Rosen, 2018).  Emerging threats in global terrorism forced Congress to turn to the DOD to quickly global security needs, heighten concerns that security assistance was becoming part of a much larger issue of a more militarized U.S. foreign policy.

Figure 2

Share of State Department and DOD security assistance funding, FY 2006 to 2017

Source: Bergmann & Schmitt (2021)

Within the last few years, Congress has acted to streamline, assess, monitor, and evaluate the various DOD security assistance programs through the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 and FY 2017 NDAA (Ross & Dalton, 2017). Public scrutiny of some U.S. security sector assistance programs has been raised, such as DOD's security assistance to Ukraine, leading to the impeachment of former President Trump (Gilsinan, 2019).  U.S. security sector assistance has grown highly complex due to the various needs demanded from the Global War on Terrorism.  As the United States pivots towards new priorities in U.S. national security geared towards great power competition has sparked debate on improving U.S. security assistance that better addresses accountability and transparency. 

The Necessity of Partner Capacity Building Security Assistance

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2010) outlines that the strategic reality surrounding security assistance policy requires focusing on building partner capacity to ensure effective, credible, and sustainable local partners.  However, U.S. security assistance is plagued by outdated legislation, a complex network of authorities within the U.S. government, resource shortfalls, and cumbersome processes (Gates, 2010).  Gates (2010) points out that the U.S. government has realized that the security sector of partner nations is more than simply training and equipping troops but building institutions, human capital, justice, and other governance and oversight mechanisms touting operation success in the Philippines and Yemen.  Additionally, "duel-key" decision-making at DOD and State Department has been used to assist Lebanon, Indonesia, and Malaysia (Gates, 2010). Gates (2010) states a few principles that should guide future partner capacity that hinges on a process with effective Congressional oversight measures, ongoing and long-term assistance, and reinforcing the State Department in the leading manager role.  The U.S. government had become reluctant to replicate another large-scale intervention that involved massive amounts of U.S. forces and turned to the idea of U.S. security assistance to achieve U.S. national security interests. Secretary Gates' vision would continue to influence DOD's security assistance philosophy into the 2018 National Defense Strategy while potential reforms were discussed in Congress.

Sufficient Congressional Reforms to DOD Security Assistance

Assistant Security of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, Dr. James Anderson (2019) noted that DOD security assistance needed to be more holistic that welcomed the need for additional policy oversight advocated by Secretary Gates nearly ten years earlier and more aligned with recent changes to U.S. foreign policy objectives (DOD, 2018). In 2017, Congress legislated the most extensive security assistance reform in U.S. history that streamlined the DOD security assistance enterprise while establishing human rights requirements, institutional capacity building, and assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (Anderson, 2019). The DOD has been streamlining its programs and authorities while incorporating compliance with the 1974 Leahy law. As a result, DOD security assistance centered around a single command under the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Anderson, 2019). Anderson (2019) highlights that since DOD security assistance programs have unified under a single authority, there has been movement from year-to-year planning to lifecycle planning. These structural changes also drive towards incorporating the most crucial legislative component to DOD security assistance reform: assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework.   

The assessment, monitoring, and evaluation requirement is the most significant reform component that gives the DOD framework to assess their security assistance programs against fraud, waste, and abuse (Anderson, 2019).  Anderson (2019) admits DOD assessment, monitoring, and evaluation implementation is in the initial phase that targets FY 2021 security assistance programs and beyond for full compliance.  Monitoring existing programs through assessment, monitoring, and evaluation is targeted for FY 2020; however, mitigating manpower shortfalls must be addressed before assessment, monitoring, and evaluation can run as intended (Anderson, 2019).  The recent congressional reforms have empowered the DOD to continue its security assistance mission that is more organized and more accountable than ever. Many in the DOD believe the effectiveness of existing U.S. security assistance against fraud, waste, and abuse has been sufficiently addressed by Congress; however, other national security experts strongly disagree that the existing DOD security assistance enterprise is adequate.

Significant Corruption Problems in Partner Capacity Building to Weak States

Multiple academics and policymakers have criticized that the partner-building capacity strategy outlined by Secretary Gates in 2010 has backfired as security assistance programs to weak states have been embroiled in creating more governance problems than fixing them.  The U.S. government has identified integrating governance issues into its various security assistance programs; however, the problem is that assistance to weak states means partnering with corrupt institutions and individuals that have no interest in better governance (Chayes, 2016;  Goodman & Arabia, 2018).  Corruption, bribery, coup-proofing, and ghost soldiers are most notably known in Iraq or Afghanistan; however, similar risk exposure to those problematic issues exists in every current U.S. security assistance program (Goodman & Arabia, 2018; Tankel et al., 2020). Systemic corruption in weak states is not going unnoticed by U.S. policymakers; however, the United States looks away from those pressing those governance issues since that regime is advancing U.S. national security objectives (Chayes, 2016; Gilsian, 2019; Trisko-Darden, 2020; Whitlock, 2019). Whitlock (2019) and Chayes (2016) highlight that the U.S. officials believed corruption in Afghanistan was a short-term side effect, justifying that governance priorities were unnecessary, which created a robust kleptocracy within the Afghan government, eroding the Afghan public's trust.  U.S. negligence towards corruption and governance has led to spectacular failures, most notably in Iraq in 2014. Iraqi security forces crumbled to ISIS despite numerical and material superiority supported by $25 billion in U.S. train and equip assistance program between 2003 and 2011 (Gilsian, 2019).  All U.S. security assistance decision-making on withdrawal or maintaining despite corruption issues is a highly political affair between the executive and legislative branches that amplify management problems around various security assistance programs.

Smaller Footprint Security Assistance is High Risk, Low Reward

The mindset from U.S. officials believing that corruption is a temporary side-effect extends to smaller footprint security programs such as Mali, Somalia, Yemen, and others with devastating consequences.  Mali experienced military coups in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021 by a U.S.-trained Malian colonel Assimi Gota, which resulted in the suspension of U.S. security assistance and experts pointing out that Western security assistance neglected to incorporate governance objectives (Dion & Cole, 2020; Felix, 2020). Trisko-Darden (2020) emphasizes that the current concerns in places such as Mali, Somalia, or Afghanistan to building partner capacity are historically tied through the lens of Cold War-era U.S. security assistance. Cold War-era autocratic dictators abused their power, undermining governance and ultimately creating more significant long-term security problems while receiving endless amounts of aid to fight against communism (Karlin, 2017; Trisko-Darden, 2020). Despite the degrees of separation where the U.S. actively involved militarily in these states in places like Afghanistan does not matter, as the U.S. is supporting unscrupulous states taking advantage of the U.S. in the name of counterterrorism and great power competition.  Sarah Chayes (2016) states that corrupt regimes will utilize a strategy of fear to the donor country, portraiting instability and chaos if the donor cuts off aid. The corrupt regime is portraited as the only viable option to tackle the donor state's objectives despite any reservations, thus reinforcing and becoming complicit in the enabling corruption process.  When the U.S. wants to cut ties to corrupt regimes working against its interests, the U.S. is inconsistent, and the cut-off is temporary since the U.S. is unwilling to enforce conditions (Tankel et al., 2019).  The problem is further exasperated by the U.S. lacking an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework for all U.S. security sector assistance programs until 2017 (Anderson, 2019).  The risks associated with low footprint security assistance essentially retain the same risks as more extensive footprint programs with a lower ceiling on returns.   

Restoring State Department Leadership to U.S. Security Assistance

            Many security assistance reformers advocate for restoring the State Department in the leading managing role for U.S. security assistance, including many influential voices at the DOD.  Bergmann and Schmitt (2021) note that the Global War on Terrorism has created an overlapping and bifurcated U.S. security assistance enterprise that could be resolved by shifting DOD's security assistance funding to the State Department coupled with massive structural reform.  Security assistance is primarily acknowledged as a political process rather than a technical one (Karlin, 2017). The State Department is better equipped to handle various political considerations over an apolitical DOD to elevate and maintain foreign policy values such as human rights and democracy promotion (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021). The stovepiping of security programs between the State Department and DOD has made it more challenging to bring accountability to assess fraud, waste, and abuse in specific assistance programs. Specific long-term security assistance programs supporting Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine are incredibly politically sensitive that require foreign policy considerations beyond security and safeguards against abuse.  Tankel et al. (2019) highlight that solid and stable political institutions, best identified by State Department officials, in assisted countries are a good indicator of success in Colombia, Indonesia, South Korea, and Jordan.  The political misalignment issues surrounding governance in many current security assistance programs can be primarily addressed through restoring State Department leadership and accountability of these programs. 

The problem for revitalizing the State Department's security assistance leadership role is two-fold based on congressional action to implement these changes and the department's current inflexibility and lack of agility to meet the ever-changing U.S. security landscape demands.  There is a significant challenge in drumming up Congressional support for this reform as Congress has recently concluded reforms of the DOD side of security assistance programs on top of historical Congressional skepticism of the State Department (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  Many advocates of this reform would argue the current state of disempowerment for the State Department has been primarily created by the executive branch and Congress.  The FY 2020 budget bolsters this point revealing that the State Department's security assistance programs would be cut by 18 percent versus a 5 percent increase for DOD security assistance programs that have primarily operated in obscurity (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021; Karlin, 2017).  Congressional micromanagement of the State Department's security assistance programs amplifies perceptions of inflexibility and sluggishness (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021; Sadler, 2021). Security assistance and cooperation is not just military aid that should be under the purview of the DOD; it is foreign aid that has significant political dimensions that need to be appropriately managed by the State Department.     

  The State Department Cannot Lead Security Assistance

Critics of State Department management of security assistance have successfully justified State Department security programs are inflexible, negative bureaucratic incentives, and department timidness on requesting more money from Congress to transfer more authority to DOD regardless of the risks.  Bergmann and Schmitt (2021) point out that the most extensive funded security assistance program, foreign military financing, is primarily congressionally directed funding to specific foreign partners. Financing security assistance through the DOD has become normalized and acceptable because there are more flexible lines of accounting and easier to legislate passage through the must-pass NDAA bills (Bergmann and Schmitt, 2021).  The status quo of how the State Department currently runs security assistance experienced by its turf battles, incoherent lines of authority, and sluggish decision-making coupled with recent Congressional reform efforts at DOD security assistance emboldens critics.  Critics also point out that regional bureaus in the State Department hate to cut assistance funding to the countries they manage and evaluate; however, proponents note this issue persists in the DOD and other federal government departments (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  The internal challenges that the State Department faces cannot be ignored, which reinforces the perception that the State Department cannot be the hierarchical leader in security assistance.

 Skepticism of foreign aid, including security assistance,  has led to a top-down review of foreign assistance by the Trump administration (Tankel et al., 2019).  As a result, the administration has leaned on an updated arms transfer policy and reliance on defense arms trade as the bulk of foreign assistance, which bypasses most State Department ran programs (Tankel et al., 2019).  Critics point out that recent DOD security assistance reforms are promising enough to ensure adequate security assistance cooperation between the State Department and DOD to manage strategic and operational needs of various security assistance programs addressing U.S. security needs (Sadler, 2021).  What proponents retort is that security assistance for security purposes is still ultimately political and involves governance metrics (Tankel et al., 2019; Sadler, 2021).  Trump administration's arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were conducted under compliance with policy and technology release requirements on top of the justification of counter Iranian influence in the region (Tankel et al., 2019).  Since Iran presents a significant security threat to the U.S. in the Middle East and beyond, dealing with and bolstering the security of autocratic Gulf States is imperative over all other values-based policy considerations being pursued at the State Department. The security first imperative by State Department critics advocates that the DOD continue managing its security programs against fraud, waste, abuse according to current laws while treating the State Department as an equal partner.

Establish Anti-Corruption a Foundational Metric of Security Assistance Aid Programs

            The most significant takeaway from arguments surrounding security assistance reform that needs to be advocated is that corruption in foreign, fragile states must be taken more seriously than before. Bellows (2020) recommends that partner-building capacity programs need mandatory corruption risk assessments since the demands for these programs will not diminish.  U.S. risk assessment of assistance programs needs to place anti-corruption as a top-five metric for assessing partnership assistance. Chayes (2016) writes about the dire implications of ignoring, downplaying, enabling corruption during her stent leading the International Security Assistance Force anti-corruption task force in 2009-2011 has primarily contributed to the dismal political state of affairs in Afghanistan today, as well as events in Iraq. Ignorance of corruption risks has played out to enormous failure in Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia, Egypt, and Pakistan.  U.S. policymakers need to understand that effective management of corruption risks can significantly enhance the security landscape. Specific, mandatory anti-corruption provisions that accurately identify the structure of corrupt networks that incorporates intelligence on revenue streams, external enablers, and connections with the military can assist in the analysis of the severity and nature of corruption in partner countries (Goodman & Arabia, 2018). The first step in reducing fraud, waste, and abuse is acknowledging that fighting corruption is not in competition against security.

Fortunately, the Biden administration has recently identified that fighting corruption is a core U.S. national interest (U.S. Government, 2021).  It remains to be seen what comes out in terms of actionable policy from this memorandum that is currently generating interagency review through 15 departments, agencies, and offices.  The document outlines that corruption threatens national security, economic equity, global anti-poverty and development efforts, and democracy (the U.S. Government, 2021). Corruption is acknowledged to having massive repercussions to not only U.S. society but global society.  A promising provision specifically addresses building better practices and mechanisms in foreign assistance and security cooperation with built-in corruption prevention measures (the U.S. Government, 2021).  Corruption and good governance are not ideas that are compatible with each other, which is instrumental in convening the importance of U.S. security assistance talking points that acknowledge governance is essential to security.  While attempting to elevate anti-corruption in security assistance has been a battle waged by various experts and policymakers for over a decade, the importance of fighting corruption to address systematic fraud, waste, and abuse in security assistance finally sees the priority it deserves.

Enhancing Restrictions and Conditioning of U.S. Security Assistance

            A significant amount of clarity needs to be provided early on the American side on what sort of restrictions and conditioning is associated with security assistance.  Karlan (2017) points out that Washington does not do the parameters and purpose of security assistance very well.  Incidentally, this issue contributes to the wildly unpredictable nature of withdrawing and maintaining various security assistance programs to fragile states. The U.S. cannot give in to the fear strategy many aid recipient states will attempt to entangle the U.S. into further unsavory security positions it seeks to avoid. Political pressures will remain when pulling the plug on ineffective programs while holding onto other programs while accepting high risks to fraud, waste, and abuse.  Building a baseline framework that identifies what triggers could spark a change or termination of security assistance will significantly drive the more challenging decision-making choices when the time comes.

Many policymakers want to adopt a framework of positive conditionality in U.S. security assistance that would provide additional incentives to do better to receive more aid. Ross & Dalton (2020) new U.S. security assistance programs planning should be built at the beginning that clearly outlines conditions with clear objectives, milestones, and metrics between the U.S. and aid recipient state. Establishing clear guidance helps reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse surround security sector assistance. The U.S. should not be giving out lethal aid early on to ensure the right improvements to security sector governance are measurably improving.  The difficulty in implementing positive conditionality is how recipient states will react to these changes and the possibility of divergent interests between the U.S. and recipient state.  U.S. policymakers need to adopt a formal risk framework that can weigh various risks that include risks of inaction (Watts, 2019).  Watts (2019) points out that proper risk assessment and conditioning frameworks have been occurring in the foreign aid development community for several years at the U.S. Agency for International Development. How U.S. security assistance aid has evaded formal assessment and evaluation for this long is a surprising revelation that needs to be rectified.  Risks to security sector assistance cannot be entirely avoided; there is a dire need to establish risk management techniques that incorporate restrictions and conditions to anticipate and mitigate risks against potential fraud, waste, and abuse.

Assessing an Effective State Department Leadership Role

            Security assistance is undoubtedly a political action that is best served under the leadership purview of the State Department.  There is no need to have a dual-structure security assistance enterprise bureaucracy and policy consideration that incorporates the full spectrum of foreign policy values and objectives is best addressed by the State Department over the DOD (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  The DOD prides itself as an apolitical organization that is wading in too deep into the politics of U.S. foreign policy.  DOD is ill-equipped to deal with corruption and values-based foreign policy objectives desired to be incorporated from the ground up from the American public, Congress, the White House, the State Department, and other non-defense agencies.  Security is much more than a military consideration; while it is essential, it cannot dominate the security conversation.  Recipient countries' political and military institutions need to be thoroughly evaluated for corruption risk. Watts (2019) notes that the DOD does not do a political risk assessment and leaving such reviews to the State Department to conduct.  The DOD is unwilling to wade deep into the politics and socio-economics of the countries they operate in, which is incredibly risky in an era of great power competition. Ultimately, this leaves the State Department as the only entity capable of assessing political and socio-economic risks to be incorporated in the analysis of security assistance viability that would increase accountability and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse.

Despite the clear need for the State Department to reassume the leadership role in security assistance, there are structural issues at the State Department that need to be addressed if and when the State Department retakes the security assistance leadership role. Bergmann & Schmitt (2021) lay out the existing structural challenges within the State Department that inhibit giving the State Department its role back regarding a complicated management structure, questionable decision-making priorities, and the need for assessment and evaluation.  Regional bureaus that manage the various country-by-country U.S. security assistance programs have just as questionable priorities as the DOD. Instead of ignoring politics at the DOD, the State Department favors maintaining and improving diplomatic relations at costs higher than human rights values (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  The decision-making logic at the regional bureau level is on par for enabling fraud, waste, and abuse as the DOD ignores security assistance's political implications.  Since anti-corruption and reducing fraud, waste, and abuse is paramount to advancing U.S. national security objectives, in that case, the culture of the State Department needs to undergo an extensive overhaul as it receives the leadership role.  There will be little point to advocate the leadership role for the State Department if they are falling into a similar trap as the DOD, which makes the suggested State Department reforms by Bergmann and Schmitt (2021) to be significantly important.  While the State Department is in a better holistic position to accurately address all the foreign policy implications of potential security assistance actions, this leadership advocation hinges on reforming the State Department of its insufficiencies and toxic culture.

Conclusion

            The importance of U.S. security assistance will continue to be a critical cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for years to come to build partner capacity to fulfill U.S. national security objectives, whether that is counterterrorism or great power competition.  Recent congressional legislation partially helped address problems with U.S. security assistance programs, with some believing in the sufficiency of those reforms.   The lack of addressing corruption in recipient aid countries has primarily contributed to the numerous U.S. security assistance program failures in the Global War on Terrorism era. Despite going to smaller footprint security assistance programs, those programs have faced fraud, waste, and abuse. The U.S. has withdrawn assistant to places like Mali and Somalia in light of coups and instability that finally undermined U.S. activities in the region. Debate rages on how the State Department could regain its leadership role in U.S. security assistance; however, critics point out that significant structural and mindset issues prevent the State Department from regaining the mantle.  Much work remains to improve U.S. security assistance that needs to put anti-corruption at the heart of security assistance, enhance risk management and conditionality mechanisms, and reform the State Department to reassume leadership.  The evolution in strengthening the effectiveness and stewardship of U.S. security assistance is an ongoing effort that showcases a long struggle between achieving security at any cost while fighting to implement accountability and transparency measures to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. 

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