The Book Club: Discussing Chapter 1 "Against Realism" of Just and Unjust Wars

Just and Unjust Wars by Michael Walzer is a modern exploration into military ethics and the exploration of Just War theory about war justification and the ethical limits on the conduct of war.  The book was published in 1977 as a result of Walzer's reflection on the Vietnam War.  The 5th edition of the book was published in 2015 and includes remarks on the Global War on Terrorism.  The book is considered standard literature on the ethics of warfare and a major contemporary statement of just war theory.

Just war theory summary:

The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure war is morally justifiable through a series of criteria, all of which must be met for a war to be considered just. The criteria are split into two groups: "right to go to war" (jus ad bellum) and "right conduct in war" (jus in bello). The first concerns the morality of going to war, and the second the moral conduct within war.  Recently there have been calls for the inclusion of a third category of just war theory—jus post bellum—dealing with the morality of post-war settlement and reconstruction.

Influential contributors to just war theory include Aristotle and Christian philosophers Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas.  The core of just war theory before Michael Walzer's book is derived from Thomas Aquinas as the theory was solidified through his writings.

Discussion

We'll be kicking off our discussion of Chapter 1 from Just and Unjust Wars. At some point tomorrow I'll throw some questions in here to get you thinking, but otherwise feel free to bring your own questions and ideas regarding the discussion (with relevance to the content of what we read!). 

Alrighty, here are a few questions I jotted down to get some ideas flowing, but don't feel compelled to answer these if you don't want to. We'll say that discussion opens up around midnight EST (GMT-5) on Sunday if that works with you all. 

Q1: Recall Walzer’s assessment of necessity, and the way in which it is employed by Athenian generals as reflective of the realities of war in order to avoid questions of legality/morality. Can you think of any contemporary scenarios (wars, battles, etc.) where this idea has been invoked?

Q2: Does the Melian dialogue imply an absence of ‘what is right’ when it comes to dealing with comparably weaker state actors? How would this calculation change if Athens was facing a more or less equal state actor?

Q3: Do you agree with the characterization of Thucydides as a ‘realist’? If possible, compare with other literature that discusses the role Thucydides plays in (or against) the realist tradition.

Person A: 

But about contemporary scenarios, it reminded me a lot of the LIFE magazine I have which broke the news about My Lai massacre and they invoke a lot of rhetoric that could be applied to the Athenian generals In reality though, the notions of realism in war and the moral judgments we make about it are something that happens in almost every conflict

Person B: 

Walzer wrote the book as part of his grips to understanding the events of the Vietnam War.

Person A: 

Yeah its 1977 right. I do see a lot of rhetoric, especially online, of this type of equivocation of force, this sort of "well they would do it to us if only they had the capability", which Walzer touches on a bit.

In that Athens naturalized its interests as some sort of "way of the world" akin to a law of nature of humanity, in which this sort of atrocity and force is an integral part of humanity and human struggle, which seems to be invoked most commonly in European fascist movements. This sort of naturalization of "struggle" and conflict is a very strict binary.

Person C: 

I sense some intentional allusions to modern imperialism too, particularly the sort of idea that if we don’t establish supremacy someone else is going to in our stead. And that being perceived as weak in a hostile interstate environment is basically a death sentence

I will also say that I think what has held pretty steady over the years is this relationship being employed between necessity and inevitably as sorta being one and the same - the attack of Melos being a necessary byproduct of maintaining empire obviously has a lot of echoes to the argument of necessity that policies like containment have at/around the point of time Walzer is writing, or really any other overarching strategy that's defined the era of our security state at any given time. 

And ofc the point I appreciate from Walzer is that you can't really make that argument without hindsight, that inevitability is really only visible through the eyes of a historian and not the actors living out the history of the present moment. 

Person D: 

I always took this as the most important characteristic of the Melian Dialogue. One aspect of it that has always struck out to me (especially given its canonical place within Realism) is that it is fundamentally a negotiation the Athenians want (at least in the script) to talk Melos down to them, getting Melos to just cough up tribute and concede to Athenian hegemony is the fastest and most normatively synchronous means of resolving a situation in a manner that is conforming of the standards expected of hegemon. As Walzer says, "There are conflicting commitments and obligations that force us into violent antagonism even when we see the point of one an­ other's positions" and you can see those conflicting commitments and red-lines present in the text and yet undoubtedly what is also there in the criticality of the moment is also an incredible amount of political agency on the part of both Melos and Athens to try and satisfy those commitments and obligations. The fact that such an outcome didn't come to pass is what makes the dialogue such a tragic text.

Person E: 

Q1. the most obvious one that comes to my head is the use of mass aerial bombardment during wartimes but especially WW2. The use of them is often inaccurate and bombings occur when the ones doing the bombing are well aware that they will commit an act that will put civilians or locations thought to be housing civilians or non-combatants at risk. The justification is often used to either target supposed objectives relevant to the ability of the target country to wage war or more simply to ‘bring the war home’ and create a sense of pressure by the bombings to demoralize the civilian population in an effort to harm their psychological willingness to continue to aid their country’s war effort. Q2. Overall no. I feel that Athens knew what the ‘right’ course of actions was, but in an effort to enforce their shaky control over other subjugated states in their empire, felt that they could allow Melos to continue its independent neutrality. I feel the same would hold even more true for an equal power actor as, at its core, Athen’s decisions towards Melos were predicated on their uneasy feelings regarding control of their situation. Q3. I haven’t read a lot of other literature to compare Thucydides to a non-realist position. So I rather default to the default position that Thucydides interpretation of the Peloponnesian War is based on ‘realism’ although Thucydides’s own personal involvement in the war could cloud his interpretation of events.

Person C:

Responding to: it's also worth mentioning as well the cultural context, Melos was a former colony of Sparta and I imagine that undoubtedly had a big role to play in why they found the idea of submission so offensive

Ah yeah, that context does make sense - the passage I'm recalling does make reference to an appeal to Sparta to come to their aid but obviously never happened.

Responding to: Q1. the most obvious one that comes to my head is the use of mass aerial bombardment during wartimes but especially WW2. The use of them is often inaccurate and bombings occur when the ones doing the bombing are well aware that they will commit an act that will put civilians or locations thought to be housing civilians or non-combatants at risk. The justification is often used to either target supposed objectives relevant to the ability of the target country to wage war or more simply to ‘bring the war home’ and create a sense of pressure by the bombings to demoralize the civilian population in an effort to harm their psychological willingness to continue to aid their country’s war effort.

Yeah, I thought of the WW2 bombings like Curtis LeMay's campaign in the Pacific or even Israel's strikes into Gaza, given the dynamics at play share a lot in common. My memory is sorta blurring the Preface of the book and Ch 1 together but Walzer actually does make reference to this topic when hes talking about non-state actors fighting mixed within civilian populations/locations, partially bc it's asymmetric and there's no way they're fighting a fair fight, and partly bc that's the truth of it; that the actors are the civilians and the line isn't as clear as soldier A and civilian B. Especially now so I think that comparison is even more common than at the time Walzer was originally writing this in 1977 (the revised version was released in late 2014/early 2015 iirc)

Person F: 

Q1: My mind immediately jumped to the nuking of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and how the present controversy or rather a debate centers largely on what the consequences would have been after the fact rather than on the fact we had a bomb and were itching to use it. You see this stretched to other, non-war areas of human life though, and I can't help but see the concept of war necessity in relation to the phrase "the ends justify the means," so oft-invoked in defense from an atrocity.

Q2: I concur with Person E's take here, and likewise read the same echoes of containment Person C. The idea of hegemonic necessity is inherently predicated on devaluing the rights of others over one's dreams of an empire. I also do not believe this implies an absence of "what is right," either. Is tribute or destruction truly the only two available options to Athens? Without having read the original text, it's hard for me to judge whether it is pride or fear that lead to the eventual Athenian position. In either case, they have lost the moral high ground. The way to avoid the fear of a crumbling empire is to not build a fragile empire reliant on fear in the first place. 

Q3: I do not have enough learning in realist lit or thought to take a position either way here.

Person B: 

So we have to look back at how Athenian power grew as part of the Delian League to fight off the Persian Empire. At some point, this coalition went from defensive necessity to going on the offensive success against the Persians to end that conflict. Persian interest in Greek affairs did not end and was involved in supporting the Peloponnesian League. On the longer scope of things, building alliances against Persia would be a common theme as seen with the League of Corinth by Philip II of Macedon. The Greek position on moving hegemonic power is tied to having enough military and economic power to counter against another outside threat while that can mean having a hegemonic position over other city-states. When Athens finally lost the Peloponnesian War, Sparta became the hegemon and eventually lost that position to Thebes by 362 BC. Eventually, this would pave the way for Macedonian hegemony over Greece and finally produce Alexander the Great's conquest against the waning Persian hegemon.

Thebesian hegemony was ruthlessly crushed by the Macedonians while Thebes enlisted the help of Athens and tried to retain control that resulted in the destruction of Thebes and most of the city sold into slavery.  Ironically, Thebes would ally against whatever current ruling Greek hegemon just because they thought they were too powerful, which also meant they allied with Persia once.

Person D: 

I find the perspectives here interesting especially in relation to the idea of 'Athens losing the moral high ground' In many respects, this is the inversion of traditional realist and constructivist (IR terms) interpretations of the Melian dialogue. The realist argument, the one that Walzer is directly engaging with, tends to view the Melian dialogue as evidence of the clear systemic necessity.

As Person B says, the power of Athens as a hegemon was proportional to its power (and security) over the other city-states of Greece; hence, what happened at Melos is no more a choice than your need to eat (or sleep) in order to continue existing If Athens wanted to guarantee its existence, security and autonomy it needed (within a realist lens) to dominate others, it needed to pursue hegemony. And this is a perspective you see the Athenians (in the writing of Thucy) raise in the dialogue with the Melians. They aren't just approaching the conversation as 'we want to subordinate you' they're saying 'we have to do this'.

Person B: 

The other problem for the Melian dialogue is that the siege of Melos in 416 BC. Occurred in an unease peace from the first phase of the war that ended in 421 BC. The real geopolitical disaster is not Melos but the huge military disaster in Sicily shortly after the events at Melos.

Person D: 

Yeah, I do think that there's (especially when you widen your lens beyond Melos) a clear argument to be made that Athens was basically grasping at this time to defend itself. This is something that realists do underprivilege.

Person B: 

What broke Athenian hegemony and other states that were neutral city-states started to take side against Athens after the Sicilian campaign disaster.

Person D: 

It's why I find Person F's analysis interesting, 'In either case, they have lost the moral high ground. The way to avoid the fear of a crumbling empire is to not build a fragile empire reliant on fear in the first place.' It's very close to historical sociological readings of the conflict.

Person B: 

I know a lot of the particular snippets are still within the framing of the book on the war.

Person D: 

Arguably these are even lessons Sparta tried to learn after they sought to reconstruct the Greek system following the conflict

Person B: 

In the context of ancient Greece, there are two lenses of hegemonic management. One is the external hegemon of Persia and the domestic growth of a Greek hegemon. Ironically, this attempt of trying to manage an internal hegemon would eventually give way to the successive efforts of Macedonian hegemony at the biggest scale.

Person D:

Do you think there might be issues trying to view Persia through a lens of 'hegemony'? This is a question that I wanted to bring up through constructivist lenses who tend to argue that it is crucial to look at hegemony through a cultural lens as a concept very specific to how Greek society at an inter-political level operated. A product of the Greek idea that the highest unit of social life was a bounded polis.

Person B: 

I don't think there is an issue because of the influence of Persia in Greek affairs until Alexander. Persian actions in the Peloponnesian War significantly increases after the failed Sicilian campaign and actively helping Sparta's Peloponnesian League.

A case in point is the Peace of Antalcidas for the Corinthian War that occurred shortly the after Peloponnesian War. While certainly not to take away the agency of domestic operations from Greeks within Greece, but when your diplomat travels all the way to Susa to get this treaty certainly speaks to the limit of a vacuum of Greek affairs being strictly Greek.

Since the thing being challenged by Persia is the concept of belonging to a singular polis. How does one counter against this big empire that does not care about that idea? The Dalian League and later the Athenian Empire owns its existence to the outside pressures of Persia.

Since the very justification to create the Dalian League and the Hellenic League gets fast-tracked by Persia. Now obviously, you can take the alliance concept to whatever ends one wants thinks is prudent. However, the breakdown of the Hellenic League with Sparta and others in the Peloponnesian League was already concerned about Athenian intentions about their power and the security needs for Asia Minor Greeks. Bolstering Asia Minor though inadvertently powers Athens though versus Sparta's needs. But that also goes back to the struggle of the idea of the polis and the ebb and flow of city-state alliances in ancient Greece since that could be determined at self-interest at the polis level and what its needs were versus its capabilities towards various identified threats and then deciding how to build collective capabilities with like-minded polis.

One overlooked area from this week's question is when talking about the Melian Dialogue is about how Walzer talks about earlier precedence on the event about Athenian policy against Mytilene, where Athens does approve to massacre all the men in the city and sell the women and children into slavery because they revolted. This occurred in 428 BC as the Peloponnesian War was in its third year. However, there was an immediate dialogue in Athens and a new order was put out that ultimately only killed 1000 men on Mytilene.

The Melian Dialogue will become important again when the question about neutrality is addressed in the book and especially the modern aspects of breaking neutrality by a warring state is to be addressed again. The question of "true neutrality" and military necessity, in the case of the island of Melos, there could be an unwritten portion about the military value of the natural harbor of Melos to any navy, especially one with a campaign to Sicily under advanced planning during the events of Melos. The route of the Athenian navy to Sicily passes Melos. Although as Thucydides writes it, the argument being made by Athens is simply Machiavellian in nature towards Melos with "might makes right". When reading the History of the Peloponnesian War the Melian Conference is at the 60% point of the book. Thucydides notes that the events of Melos take place in the 16th year of the Peloponnesian War. Immediately following the Melian dialogue is Thucydides writing the 17th year of the war (the second phase of the war) about the Sicilian military expedition setting off from Athens. As Walzer writes about that there were moral considerations behind the double thinking within Athens about what to do with revolting Mytilene, why the resort to realism in the case of Melos? Also, I know that for modern morality sake here, it is unacceptable to our minds about sieging a city and contemplating killing all the military-aged males and selling everyone else into slavery/exile; however, as Walzer points out the historical relativism of what I would largely consider a somewhat normative accepted moral behavior between warring actors throughout much of the ancient world.

Person F: 

I did some reading last night on political realism to come back to this because I feel as though I was missing the lens that this was viewed through for Walzer. I do want to come back to this statement from Walzer on necessity. 

"First, it evades the moral question of whether the preservation of the empire was itself necessary. There were some Athenians, at least, who had doubts about that, and more who doubted that the empire had to be a uniform system of domination and subjection (as the policy adopted for Melos suggested). Secondly, it exaggerates the knowledge and foresight of the generals. They are not saying with certainty that Athens will fall unless Melos is destroyed; their argument has to do with probabilities and risks. And such arguments are always arguable. Would the destruction of Melos really reduce Athenian risks? Are there alternative policies? What are the likely costs of this one? Would it be right? What would other people think of Athens if it were carried out?"

As we see with the failed Athenian invasion of Sicily, it is fathomable that in making what they believe to be the "right" choice, they are stumbling into catastrophe. As Walzer later says re: Henry V, moral decisions can be viewed much like strategic ones; judged against their efficacy. Against this backdrop, what strategic benefit did the destruction of Melos provide to the Athenians? Did the destruction truly reduce Athenian risks? I too see "necessity" as wishcasting.

Person E: 

I felt it was seen by Athens as necessary within their logic of how they thought they managed their empire and fought the war. Reminds me of a case I read about with The Spanish colonial territory of New Spain. In an intro to a book about the Utes in Colorado, this author talks in gruesome detail about how Spanish soldiers in what is now Denver, I believe (trying to remember this from memory as I gave the book away after college) It talks about the lengths the victorious Spanish soldiers mutilated the bodies of a native tribe that attacked the local fort. This was considered unique in the context of native and Spanish violence in other parts of New Spain at the time.The author theorized that such spectacle of violence to already dead bodies was due to the precarious nature that these very remote outposts of Spanish control had. (IE the local troops went out of their way to commit such acts because they felt that grandiose displays of violence were the only way of projecting power beyond what they were actually capable of) Insecurity bred an environment of dehumanization, essentially.

Person B: 

Walzer on necessity after that statement also includes since the decision on Melos does not come from "necessity of nature" as it comes from the opinions or the results of arguments that drive decision-making. The moral point of view, which the Melian Dialogue is pretty lacking as a general consensus, is derived from the legitimacy of the actor. As Walzer points out that for the decision of Mytilene, it is a calculation of moral anxiety, not political interests that leads the Athenians to revoke their order on Mytilene versus the order on Melos.

"Judgments of necessity in this sense are always retrospective in character-the work of historians, not historical actors." 

Yes, one can judge moral and strategic decisions because there is a sense of commonality throughout the ages; however, as Walzer points out with the accounts of Agincourt, shared strategic perspective through the ages is a bit more dubious than shared morals. Walzer brings up the strategic accounts of Waterloo as strategists seek to find lessons learned about matters of command responsibility, failures of discipline or control, about strategic imperatives ignored.

"The moral theorist is in the same position. He too must come to grips with the fact that his rules are often violated or ignored-and with a deeper realization that, to men at war, the rules often don't seem relevant to the extremity of the situation. But however he does this, he does not surrender his sense of war as a human action, purposive and premediated, for whose effects someone is responsible. Confronted with the many crimes of a war, or with the crime of aggressive war itself, he searches for human agents. Nor is he alone in this search. It is one of the most important features of war, distinguishing it from other scourges of mankind, that the men and women caught up in it are not only victims, they are also participants."

For the Peloponnesian War, we have Athens planning a new expedition to Sicily. I should mention there was a previous campaign to Sicily (although not as large or with the imperialist ambitions of the second one) in 427 BCE versus the second one in 415 BCE. Athens and Sparta were able to negotiate some sort of uneasy peace agreement in 421 BCE; however, renewed fighting would come from respective city-states allied to each side being egged on to do stuff to curb those powers. In 418 BCE, there was the Battle of Mantinea which the Athenian coalition forces lost, which resulted in city-states within the Peloponnese forcibly switch sides, reliving a lot of pressure off Sparta within its core territory. On top of that, the Peloponnesian War that is the part of the first chronological made history of war is actually the second Peloponnesian War and there was a previous war on Greek hegemonic management between 460 to 445 BCE where Athens is the rising hegemon versus Sparta's existing hegemon from fighting against Persia. Athens does a massive expeditionary campaign to Egypt helping the Egyptians/Libyans against Persia that eventually resulted in a massive failure, so there is precedence some 50 years before for confidence in conducting a Sicily campaign despite the results.

The problem with Walzer's question on the preservation of the Athenian empire is not that people having doubts about it but the concept and formation of hegemonic activity pre-dates Athens' logic to pursue hegemonic activities. Activities of the Delian League under Athens counterattacking Persia in Asia Minor brought forth the balance of power in favor of the Greeks; however, in the aftermath of the Second Peloponnesian War and then the Corinthian War saw Persia back in full control of Greek Asia Minor cities in a span of about 100 years. Aggressive ambitions were not limited to Athens as seen before and after the Second Peloponnesian War.

The starkness of the Melian dialogue is the result of what happens to Melos is something one finds done specifically to an enemy city in certain cases in those times and not to a neutral city.  At the end of the Second Peloponnesian War, several of Sparta's allies call for the same thing that happened on Melos to happen to Athens in the aftermath of the war.  Sparta chooses to spare Athens, which one can say was done on moral, realist, or both grounds.  I would say it is likely a combination of the two, although who knows what the full calculation behind that decision was except in hindsight keeping Athens alive did help in future hegemonic management issues

In the case of Melos, the bar leveled to them by Athens is akin to the level of a designated enemy and not a neutral.  It is about sending a message paid in blood for non-compliance to demands. The threat of revolts against Athens is real at the time as there are previous instances of it in the case of Mytilene; however, the crux of the argument for Melos' neutrality being an issue towards that end is not mentioned in detail, so the assumptions can go in several directions on what the actual or perceived threat picture was.  Melos is overshadowed by the events in Sicily in short order, so if Athens was successful in Sicily, would that bolster Athens' case more or less?

The absolute value of Athens' actions against Melos will always be valued as morally wrong, but Athens' legitimacy in the conflict is more or less determined on maintaining its existing military capabilities and being successful in utilizing those resources.  No help came to Melos and the more drastic decision-making by Athens' enemies and neutral parties comes from the military defeats in Sicily.  If there was more time in between Melos and the Sicily campaign, there would be more useful analysis in determining the factor of Melos in certain decision making if it was recorded.

In the crux of the first part of the book about "the moral reality of war" and against "realism" is two parts within the first chapter (later expanded and clarified in the next chapter):

1) There is a common experience of moral disagreements-painful, sustained, exasperating, and endless.  Walzer points out that for all the realism, it fails to get at the realities of that experience or to explain its character.  Moral definitions are not the issue, but descriptions and interpretations of those terms are the issues. (p. 11)  This is compounded by serious difficulties of perception and information, which gives rise to controversies over "the facts of the case" (p. 12).

2)  Our arguments and judgment shape a "moral reality of war"-that is, all experiences of which moral language is descriptive or within which it is necessarily employed. (p. 15) These realities is not based on the actual activities of soldiers, but by the opinions of mankind.  This activity is fixed by the work of philosophers, lawyers, and publicists throughout the ages.  We judge if an actor faces agony over a decision, claims a soldier or statesman as morally ignorant or morally insensitive, or a general being deemed reckless or ignoring danger.  These actors should ought to know what is going on, worry about them, and take the appropriate steps to avoid them.

Additionally, towards the end of the chapter:

"The case is the same in moral life: there really is a story to tell, a way of talking about wars and battles that the rest of us recognize as morally appropriate. I don't mean that particular decisions are necessarily right or wrong, or simply right or wrong, only that there is a way of seeing the world so that moral decision-making makes sense. The hypocrite know that this is true, though he may actually see the world differently. Hypocrisy is rife in wartime discourse, because it is especially important at such a time to appear to be in the right. It is not only that the moral stakes are high; the hypocrite may not understand that; more crucially, his actions will be judged by other people, who are not hypocrites, and whose judgement will affect their policies towards him. There would be no point to hypocrisy if this were not so, just as there would be no point to lying in a world where no one told the truth. The hypocrite presumes on the moral understanding of the rest of us, and we have no choice, I think, except to take his assertions seriously and put them to the test of moral realism. He pretends to think and act as the rest of us expect him to do."

With Thucydides writing on the Melian dialogue, that is the most pure example of realism, making statements just about as free of the "bullshit of morality", just one side telling another side, brutally and directly, what to do.  Why Mytilene comes up is that there was no way that the decision was made in an absence of morality, which shows precedence of caring about morality in wartime actions well before Melos.  Also, Walzer notes that the Athenian assembly did vigorously debate the merits of the Melos order, which challenges the prism of pure realism. It should be noted that Thucydides was in exile during the Melian dialogue, so it is a paraphrase as an "essence of the dialogue" as he understood it.