The Negligent Partner of Choice: Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in U.S. Security Sector Assistance

 

The Negligent Partner of Choice:

Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in U.S. Security Sector Assistance

Introduction

U.S. security assistance is one of the core foreign policy tools the U.S. government utilizes to advance its interests abroad, typically touted as an effective means to achieve U.S. national security at a low cost. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Global War on Terrorism has seen a dramatic rise in security assistance aid as billions of dollars, enormous amounts of personnel and military equipment have been handed out to ensure the security of various fragile states to combat terrorism. U.S. security assistance aid in the Global War on Terrorism era has received increased scrutiny after high-profile news of fraud, waste, and abuse in large-scale military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Since those revelations, U.S. policymakers have pivoted to relying more on smaller-scale U.S. security assistance aid in Africa, Syria, and Yemen to control potential blowback. Despite the shift, reports have challenged the claimed effectiveness of U.S. security assistance to acknowledged corrupt regimes, forcing the discussion on the right approach to U.S. security sector assistance.  U.S. security assistance aid is highly susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse that requires enhancing accountability and transparency mechanisms to enhance effectiveness to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

U.S. Security Sector Assistance Landscape

Understanding areas where fraud, waste, and abuse are prevalent in U.S. security assistance requires knowing which U.S. government agencies manage this assistance, the breadth of assistance programs, and how these programs are funded.  Esptein and Rosen (2018) report that from the fiscal year 2006 to 2017, the United States has provided over $200 billion for security assistance and cooperation programs to various foreign countries.  Bergmann and Schmitt (2021) note that the State Department manages traditional overarching authority for security assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Control Act of 1976.  The State Department ran security assistance programs are classified as the Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  The FMF program is the most significant component of U.S. security assistance, as seen in Figure 1 since FMF deals with selling U.S. military hardware and services to other countries.  Until 1980, the Department of Defense's (DOD) primary role in security assistance was implementing those State Department-funded programs.  Incrementally since 1980, the U.S. Congress has authorized DoD with more authority and direct funding under U.S. Code Title 10 (Armed Services) and the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to conduct various security assistance and cooperation activities such as training, equipment, counter-narcotics, and humanitarian assistance in the years leading up to 2001 (Esptein & Rosen, 2018).  U.S. security assistance continued to be a State Department ran operation as DOD prioritized other needs to lead up to Global War on Terrorism. 

Figure 1

U.S. Foreign Assistance, by program – FY 2017

Source: Bearak & Gamio (2016)

In 2005, Congress accelerated DOD's growth in decision-making and management roles for security assistance away from the State Department (Gates, 2010).  Fifty new security assistance programs were created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks; 48 of those programs were authorized to be managed by the DOD, which operated under less transparency and congressional oversight than State Department ran security assistance programs (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  Some specific DOD security assistance programs are Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).  Many of the DOD security assistance programs are tailored to address Global War on Terrorism issues, with several other programs covering great power competition issues dealing with Russia or China. Figure 2 reveals the consistent scope and importance of DOD's direct role in security assistance through funding appropriations, reflecting the emphasis on combatting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency from 2006 to 2017 (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021; Esptein & Rosen, 2018).  Emerging threats in global terrorism forced Congress to turn to the DOD to quickly global security needs, heighten concerns that security assistance was becoming part of a much larger issue of a more militarized U.S. foreign policy.

Figure 2

Share of State Department and DOD security assistance funding, FY 2006 to 2017

Source: Bergmann & Schmitt (2021)

Within the last few years, Congress has acted to streamline, assess, monitor, and evaluate the various DOD security assistance programs through the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 and FY 2017 NDAA (Ross & Dalton, 2017). Public scrutiny of some U.S. security sector assistance programs has been raised, such as DOD's security assistance to Ukraine, leading to the impeachment of former President Trump (Gilsinan, 2019).  U.S. security sector assistance has grown highly complex due to the various needs demanded from the Global War on Terrorism.  As the United States pivots towards new priorities in U.S. national security geared towards great power competition has sparked debate on improving U.S. security assistance that better addresses accountability and transparency. 

The Necessity of Partner Capacity Building Security Assistance

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2010) outlines that the strategic reality surrounding security assistance policy requires focusing on building partner capacity to ensure effective, credible, and sustainable local partners.  However, U.S. security assistance is plagued by outdated legislation, a complex network of authorities within the U.S. government, resource shortfalls, and cumbersome processes (Gates, 2010).  Gates (2010) points out that the U.S. government has realized that the security sector of partner nations is more than simply training and equipping troops but building institutions, human capital, justice, and other governance and oversight mechanisms touting operation success in the Philippines and Yemen.  Additionally, "duel-key" decision-making at DOD and State Department has been used to assist Lebanon, Indonesia, and Malaysia (Gates, 2010). Gates (2010) states a few principles that should guide future partner capacity that hinges on a process with effective Congressional oversight measures, ongoing and long-term assistance, and reinforcing the State Department in the leading manager role.  The U.S. government had become reluctant to replicate another large-scale intervention that involved massive amounts of U.S. forces and turned to the idea of U.S. security assistance to achieve U.S. national security interests. Secretary Gates' vision would continue to influence DOD's security assistance philosophy into the 2018 National Defense Strategy while potential reforms were discussed in Congress.

Sufficient Congressional Reforms to DOD Security Assistance

Assistant Security of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, Dr. James Anderson (2019) noted that DOD security assistance needed to be more holistic that welcomed the need for additional policy oversight advocated by Secretary Gates nearly ten years earlier and more aligned with recent changes to U.S. foreign policy objectives (DOD, 2018). In 2017, Congress legislated the most extensive security assistance reform in U.S. history that streamlined the DOD security assistance enterprise while establishing human rights requirements, institutional capacity building, and assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (Anderson, 2019). The DOD has been streamlining its programs and authorities while incorporating compliance with the 1974 Leahy law. As a result, DOD security assistance centered around a single command under the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Anderson, 2019). Anderson (2019) highlights that since DOD security assistance programs have unified under a single authority, there has been movement from year-to-year planning to lifecycle planning. These structural changes also drive towards incorporating the most crucial legislative component to DOD security assistance reform: assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework.   

The assessment, monitoring, and evaluation requirement is the most significant reform component that gives the DOD framework to assess their security assistance programs against fraud, waste, and abuse (Anderson, 2019).  Anderson (2019) admits DOD assessment, monitoring, and evaluation implementation is in the initial phase that targets FY 2021 security assistance programs and beyond for full compliance.  Monitoring existing programs through assessment, monitoring, and evaluation is targeted for FY 2020; however, mitigating manpower shortfalls must be addressed before assessment, monitoring, and evaluation can run as intended (Anderson, 2019).  The recent congressional reforms have empowered the DOD to continue its security assistance mission that is more organized and more accountable than ever. Many in the DOD believe the effectiveness of existing U.S. security assistance against fraud, waste, and abuse has been sufficiently addressed by Congress; however, other national security experts strongly disagree that the existing DOD security assistance enterprise is adequate.

Significant Corruption Problems in Partner Capacity Building to Weak States

Multiple academics and policymakers have criticized that the partner-building capacity strategy outlined by Secretary Gates in 2010 has backfired as security assistance programs to weak states have been embroiled in creating more governance problems than fixing them.  The U.S. government has identified integrating governance issues into its various security assistance programs; however, the problem is that assistance to weak states means partnering with corrupt institutions and individuals that have no interest in better governance (Chayes, 2016;  Goodman & Arabia, 2018).  Corruption, bribery, coup-proofing, and ghost soldiers are most notably known in Iraq or Afghanistan; however, similar risk exposure to those problematic issues exists in every current U.S. security assistance program (Goodman & Arabia, 2018; Tankel et al., 2020). Systemic corruption in weak states is not going unnoticed by U.S. policymakers; however, the United States looks away from those pressing those governance issues since that regime is advancing U.S. national security objectives (Chayes, 2016; Gilsian, 2019; Trisko-Darden, 2020; Whitlock, 2019). Whitlock (2019) and Chayes (2016) highlight that the U.S. officials believed corruption in Afghanistan was a short-term side effect, justifying that governance priorities were unnecessary, which created a robust kleptocracy within the Afghan government, eroding the Afghan public's trust.  U.S. negligence towards corruption and governance has led to spectacular failures, most notably in Iraq in 2014. Iraqi security forces crumbled to ISIS despite numerical and material superiority supported by $25 billion in U.S. train and equip assistance program between 2003 and 2011 (Gilsian, 2019).  All U.S. security assistance decision-making on withdrawal or maintaining despite corruption issues is a highly political affair between the executive and legislative branches that amplify management problems around various security assistance programs.

Smaller Footprint Security Assistance is High Risk, Low Reward

The mindset from U.S. officials believing that corruption is a temporary side-effect extends to smaller footprint security programs such as Mali, Somalia, Yemen, and others with devastating consequences.  Mali experienced military coups in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021 by a U.S.-trained Malian colonel Assimi Gota, which resulted in the suspension of U.S. security assistance and experts pointing out that Western security assistance neglected to incorporate governance objectives (Dion & Cole, 2020; Felix, 2020). Trisko-Darden (2020) emphasizes that the current concerns in places such as Mali, Somalia, or Afghanistan to building partner capacity are historically tied through the lens of Cold War-era U.S. security assistance. Cold War-era autocratic dictators abused their power, undermining governance and ultimately creating more significant long-term security problems while receiving endless amounts of aid to fight against communism (Karlin, 2017; Trisko-Darden, 2020). Despite the degrees of separation where the U.S. actively involved militarily in these states in places like Afghanistan does not matter, as the U.S. is supporting unscrupulous states taking advantage of the U.S. in the name of counterterrorism and great power competition.  Sarah Chayes (2016) states that corrupt regimes will utilize a strategy of fear to the donor country, portraiting instability and chaos if the donor cuts off aid. The corrupt regime is portraited as the only viable option to tackle the donor state's objectives despite any reservations, thus reinforcing and becoming complicit in the enabling corruption process.  When the U.S. wants to cut ties to corrupt regimes working against its interests, the U.S. is inconsistent, and the cut-off is temporary since the U.S. is unwilling to enforce conditions (Tankel et al., 2019).  The problem is further exasperated by the U.S. lacking an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework for all U.S. security sector assistance programs until 2017 (Anderson, 2019).  The risks associated with low footprint security assistance essentially retain the same risks as more extensive footprint programs with a lower ceiling on returns.   

Restoring State Department Leadership to U.S. Security Assistance

            Many security assistance reformers advocate for restoring the State Department in the leading managing role for U.S. security assistance, including many influential voices at the DOD.  Bergmann and Schmitt (2021) note that the Global War on Terrorism has created an overlapping and bifurcated U.S. security assistance enterprise that could be resolved by shifting DOD's security assistance funding to the State Department coupled with massive structural reform.  Security assistance is primarily acknowledged as a political process rather than a technical one (Karlin, 2017). The State Department is better equipped to handle various political considerations over an apolitical DOD to elevate and maintain foreign policy values such as human rights and democracy promotion (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021). The stovepiping of security programs between the State Department and DOD has made it more challenging to bring accountability to assess fraud, waste, and abuse in specific assistance programs. Specific long-term security assistance programs supporting Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine are incredibly politically sensitive that require foreign policy considerations beyond security and safeguards against abuse.  Tankel et al. (2019) highlight that solid and stable political institutions, best identified by State Department officials, in assisted countries are a good indicator of success in Colombia, Indonesia, South Korea, and Jordan.  The political misalignment issues surrounding governance in many current security assistance programs can be primarily addressed through restoring State Department leadership and accountability of these programs. 

The problem for revitalizing the State Department's security assistance leadership role is two-fold based on congressional action to implement these changes and the department's current inflexibility and lack of agility to meet the ever-changing U.S. security landscape demands.  There is a significant challenge in drumming up Congressional support for this reform as Congress has recently concluded reforms of the DOD side of security assistance programs on top of historical Congressional skepticism of the State Department (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  Many advocates of this reform would argue the current state of disempowerment for the State Department has been primarily created by the executive branch and Congress.  The FY 2020 budget bolsters this point revealing that the State Department's security assistance programs would be cut by 18 percent versus a 5 percent increase for DOD security assistance programs that have primarily operated in obscurity (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021; Karlin, 2017).  Congressional micromanagement of the State Department's security assistance programs amplifies perceptions of inflexibility and sluggishness (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021; Sadler, 2021). Security assistance and cooperation is not just military aid that should be under the purview of the DOD; it is foreign aid that has significant political dimensions that need to be appropriately managed by the State Department.     

  The State Department Cannot Lead Security Assistance

Critics of State Department management of security assistance have successfully justified State Department security programs are inflexible, negative bureaucratic incentives, and department timidness on requesting more money from Congress to transfer more authority to DOD regardless of the risks.  Bergmann and Schmitt (2021) point out that the most extensive funded security assistance program, foreign military financing, is primarily congressionally directed funding to specific foreign partners. Financing security assistance through the DOD has become normalized and acceptable because there are more flexible lines of accounting and easier to legislate passage through the must-pass NDAA bills (Bergmann and Schmitt, 2021).  The status quo of how the State Department currently runs security assistance experienced by its turf battles, incoherent lines of authority, and sluggish decision-making coupled with recent Congressional reform efforts at DOD security assistance emboldens critics.  Critics also point out that regional bureaus in the State Department hate to cut assistance funding to the countries they manage and evaluate; however, proponents note this issue persists in the DOD and other federal government departments (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  The internal challenges that the State Department faces cannot be ignored, which reinforces the perception that the State Department cannot be the hierarchical leader in security assistance.

 Skepticism of foreign aid, including security assistance,  has led to a top-down review of foreign assistance by the Trump administration (Tankel et al., 2019).  As a result, the administration has leaned on an updated arms transfer policy and reliance on defense arms trade as the bulk of foreign assistance, which bypasses most State Department ran programs (Tankel et al., 2019).  Critics point out that recent DOD security assistance reforms are promising enough to ensure adequate security assistance cooperation between the State Department and DOD to manage strategic and operational needs of various security assistance programs addressing U.S. security needs (Sadler, 2021).  What proponents retort is that security assistance for security purposes is still ultimately political and involves governance metrics (Tankel et al., 2019; Sadler, 2021).  Trump administration's arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were conducted under compliance with policy and technology release requirements on top of the justification of counter Iranian influence in the region (Tankel et al., 2019).  Since Iran presents a significant security threat to the U.S. in the Middle East and beyond, dealing with and bolstering the security of autocratic Gulf States is imperative over all other values-based policy considerations being pursued at the State Department. The security first imperative by State Department critics advocates that the DOD continue managing its security programs against fraud, waste, abuse according to current laws while treating the State Department as an equal partner.

Establish Anti-Corruption a Foundational Metric of Security Assistance Aid Programs

            The most significant takeaway from arguments surrounding security assistance reform that needs to be advocated is that corruption in foreign, fragile states must be taken more seriously than before. Bellows (2020) recommends that partner-building capacity programs need mandatory corruption risk assessments since the demands for these programs will not diminish.  U.S. risk assessment of assistance programs needs to place anti-corruption as a top-five metric for assessing partnership assistance. Chayes (2016) writes about the dire implications of ignoring, downplaying, enabling corruption during her stent leading the International Security Assistance Force anti-corruption task force in 2009-2011 has primarily contributed to the dismal political state of affairs in Afghanistan today, as well as events in Iraq. Ignorance of corruption risks has played out to enormous failure in Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia, Egypt, and Pakistan.  U.S. policymakers need to understand that effective management of corruption risks can significantly enhance the security landscape. Specific, mandatory anti-corruption provisions that accurately identify the structure of corrupt networks that incorporates intelligence on revenue streams, external enablers, and connections with the military can assist in the analysis of the severity and nature of corruption in partner countries (Goodman & Arabia, 2018). The first step in reducing fraud, waste, and abuse is acknowledging that fighting corruption is not in competition against security.

Fortunately, the Biden administration has recently identified that fighting corruption is a core U.S. national interest (U.S. Government, 2021).  It remains to be seen what comes out in terms of actionable policy from this memorandum that is currently generating interagency review through 15 departments, agencies, and offices.  The document outlines that corruption threatens national security, economic equity, global anti-poverty and development efforts, and democracy (the U.S. Government, 2021). Corruption is acknowledged to having massive repercussions to not only U.S. society but global society.  A promising provision specifically addresses building better practices and mechanisms in foreign assistance and security cooperation with built-in corruption prevention measures (the U.S. Government, 2021).  Corruption and good governance are not ideas that are compatible with each other, which is instrumental in convening the importance of U.S. security assistance talking points that acknowledge governance is essential to security.  While attempting to elevate anti-corruption in security assistance has been a battle waged by various experts and policymakers for over a decade, the importance of fighting corruption to address systematic fraud, waste, and abuse in security assistance finally sees the priority it deserves.

Enhancing Restrictions and Conditioning of U.S. Security Assistance

            A significant amount of clarity needs to be provided early on the American side on what sort of restrictions and conditioning is associated with security assistance.  Karlan (2017) points out that Washington does not do the parameters and purpose of security assistance very well.  Incidentally, this issue contributes to the wildly unpredictable nature of withdrawing and maintaining various security assistance programs to fragile states. The U.S. cannot give in to the fear strategy many aid recipient states will attempt to entangle the U.S. into further unsavory security positions it seeks to avoid. Political pressures will remain when pulling the plug on ineffective programs while holding onto other programs while accepting high risks to fraud, waste, and abuse.  Building a baseline framework that identifies what triggers could spark a change or termination of security assistance will significantly drive the more challenging decision-making choices when the time comes.

Many policymakers want to adopt a framework of positive conditionality in U.S. security assistance that would provide additional incentives to do better to receive more aid. Ross & Dalton (2020) new U.S. security assistance programs planning should be built at the beginning that clearly outlines conditions with clear objectives, milestones, and metrics between the U.S. and aid recipient state. Establishing clear guidance helps reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse surround security sector assistance. The U.S. should not be giving out lethal aid early on to ensure the right improvements to security sector governance are measurably improving.  The difficulty in implementing positive conditionality is how recipient states will react to these changes and the possibility of divergent interests between the U.S. and recipient state.  U.S. policymakers need to adopt a formal risk framework that can weigh various risks that include risks of inaction (Watts, 2019).  Watts (2019) points out that proper risk assessment and conditioning frameworks have been occurring in the foreign aid development community for several years at the U.S. Agency for International Development. How U.S. security assistance aid has evaded formal assessment and evaluation for this long is a surprising revelation that needs to be rectified.  Risks to security sector assistance cannot be entirely avoided; there is a dire need to establish risk management techniques that incorporate restrictions and conditions to anticipate and mitigate risks against potential fraud, waste, and abuse.

Assessing an Effective State Department Leadership Role

            Security assistance is undoubtedly a political action that is best served under the leadership purview of the State Department.  There is no need to have a dual-structure security assistance enterprise bureaucracy and policy consideration that incorporates the full spectrum of foreign policy values and objectives is best addressed by the State Department over the DOD (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  The DOD prides itself as an apolitical organization that is wading in too deep into the politics of U.S. foreign policy.  DOD is ill-equipped to deal with corruption and values-based foreign policy objectives desired to be incorporated from the ground up from the American public, Congress, the White House, the State Department, and other non-defense agencies.  Security is much more than a military consideration; while it is essential, it cannot dominate the security conversation.  Recipient countries' political and military institutions need to be thoroughly evaluated for corruption risk. Watts (2019) notes that the DOD does not do a political risk assessment and leaving such reviews to the State Department to conduct.  The DOD is unwilling to wade deep into the politics and socio-economics of the countries they operate in, which is incredibly risky in an era of great power competition. Ultimately, this leaves the State Department as the only entity capable of assessing political and socio-economic risks to be incorporated in the analysis of security assistance viability that would increase accountability and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse.

Despite the clear need for the State Department to reassume the leadership role in security assistance, there are structural issues at the State Department that need to be addressed if and when the State Department retakes the security assistance leadership role. Bergmann & Schmitt (2021) lay out the existing structural challenges within the State Department that inhibit giving the State Department its role back regarding a complicated management structure, questionable decision-making priorities, and the need for assessment and evaluation.  Regional bureaus that manage the various country-by-country U.S. security assistance programs have just as questionable priorities as the DOD. Instead of ignoring politics at the DOD, the State Department favors maintaining and improving diplomatic relations at costs higher than human rights values (Bergmann & Schmitt, 2021).  The decision-making logic at the regional bureau level is on par for enabling fraud, waste, and abuse as the DOD ignores security assistance's political implications.  Since anti-corruption and reducing fraud, waste, and abuse is paramount to advancing U.S. national security objectives, in that case, the culture of the State Department needs to undergo an extensive overhaul as it receives the leadership role.  There will be little point to advocate the leadership role for the State Department if they are falling into a similar trap as the DOD, which makes the suggested State Department reforms by Bergmann and Schmitt (2021) to be significantly important.  While the State Department is in a better holistic position to accurately address all the foreign policy implications of potential security assistance actions, this leadership advocation hinges on reforming the State Department of its insufficiencies and toxic culture.

Conclusion

            The importance of U.S. security assistance will continue to be a critical cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for years to come to build partner capacity to fulfill U.S. national security objectives, whether that is counterterrorism or great power competition.  Recent congressional legislation partially helped address problems with U.S. security assistance programs, with some believing in the sufficiency of those reforms.   The lack of addressing corruption in recipient aid countries has primarily contributed to the numerous U.S. security assistance program failures in the Global War on Terrorism era. Despite going to smaller footprint security assistance programs, those programs have faced fraud, waste, and abuse. The U.S. has withdrawn assistant to places like Mali and Somalia in light of coups and instability that finally undermined U.S. activities in the region. Debate rages on how the State Department could regain its leadership role in U.S. security assistance; however, critics point out that significant structural and mindset issues prevent the State Department from regaining the mantle.  Much work remains to improve U.S. security assistance that needs to put anti-corruption at the heart of security assistance, enhance risk management and conditionality mechanisms, and reform the State Department to reassume leadership.  The evolution in strengthening the effectiveness and stewardship of U.S. security assistance is an ongoing effort that showcases a long struggle between achieving security at any cost while fighting to implement accountability and transparency measures to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. 

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The Digital Lone Wolf: Assessing the Next Wave of US Domestic Terrorism

 

Abstract

            U.S. lone-wolf terrorism has grown in the past 20 years as effective counterterrorism efforts and advances in the internet turn potential domestic terrorists to adopt lone-wolf terrorism strategies.  While the U.S. government and academics have long spent debating American lone wolf criteria, lone wolves have entirely adapted to the online environment to facilitate planning and execution of attacks. U.S. lone-wolf terrorists come from all socioeconomic backgrounds, including the military.   The primary method of a lone-wolf incident is done with firearms directed towards the federal government and law enforcement.  While lone-wolves are generally effective in evading detection, there is an operational security flaw as they balance between secrecy and the need to publicize their attacks.  The internet revolution has transformed the U.S. domestic terrorist scene to utilize online communities to keep anonymous and encrypted to avoid detection.  While the internet’s freedom is significantly beneficial to the American economy and political life, the freedom allows a relatively easy vector of radicalization and planning for lone-wolf terrorists.

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Introduction

            American lone-wolf terrorism has long been understudied compared to organized terrorist groups due to being overshadowed by organized terror to conduct more brutal attacks and higher public visibility.  The United States has identified that the threat of lone-wolf terrorism is the most significant national security threat facing the county (MacInnis, 2011).  Effective counterterrorism strategies have made organizational affiliation increasingly onerous for terrorists; lone-wolf terrorism has become an enticing strategy against the United States and its allies that rely on technology to increase effectiveness, lethality, and organizational methods. Understanding American lone wolf terrorism sheds light on the evolution and adaption of this strategy. Exploring the efficacy of modern lone-wolf terrorism sheds light on the potential future viability of the strategy. The world appears to be facing a new wave of terrorism that is centralized by lone-wolf strategies as traditional organizational methods fall out of favor embracing the anonymity afforded by the internet. Lone-wolves in today’s world regains prominence in a digital world where information to strategize, target, and publicize is easily at one’s fingertips to a global audience. 

History of U.S. Lone Wolf Terrorism

The United States is no stranger to lone-wolf terrorists throughout its history, characterized by lone political assassins, anarchists, anti-government, and religious individuals to produce political change through violence from President Garfield's assassination 1881 to the Orlando nightclub shooting in 2016 (Simon, 2011). A host of lone-wolf actors from political dissents, anarchists, radical environmentalists, racial supremacists, and religious extremists have left their mark on American history and trying to influence the nation's political future.  Each incident within the United States has prompted a response to increase security measures and awareness of various political issues. What distinguishes early U.S. lone wolf terrorism to modern lone-wolves stems from developments within white supremacists groups in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s.

Modern manifestations of US lone-wolf terrorism have formalized the idea of a "leaderless resistance" by white supremacist Louis Beam, during the 1980s to blunt law enforcement efforts against white supremacist groups (Simon, 2011). Beam utilized the term "lone wolves" in the popular lexicon that advocated organization in five or fewer cells with independent thinking and self-directed, which found widespread adoption across all ideologies such as environmental and Islamic extremists action (Berger, 2019; Simon, 2011; Smith, 2020).  The concept of leaderless resistance from all ideologies during the 1990s and 2000s invited government crackdown coupled with unambitious planning bound in failure exemplified by Naser Abdo and others (Berger, 2019).  Revival in the leaderless resistance concept came as internet technology matured to sustain open-source social media fuel social connections like-minded individuals for all ideologies to leverage utilization (Berger, 2019; Gartenstein-Ross, & Barr, 2016; Hunter, et al., 2020). American lone-wolf terrorism history remains grounded in conducting most of their acts by using firearms or bombs despite the advances in technology that allows for more careful planning (Alfaro-Gonzalez, et al., 2015). The combination of technology and firearms is a continued hallmark theme in modern lone-wolf terrorism.

Challenge of Defining Lone Wolf Terrorism

U.S. lone wolf terrorism studies' history is complicated by the definitional dilemma brought about by governmental and academic sources.  Terrorism studies have primarily focused on organized terrorist groups, rightfully so, since group-initiated attacks are the predominant incidents within the United States.  According to the University of Maryland Global Terrorism database (2019), there have been about 7,500 terrorist attacks that have taken place within the United States; Hamm and Spaaij (2017) reveal 115 cases of authentic lone-wolf incidents.  Some researchers challenge the notion of actual lone wolves like Ted Kaczynski as a far rarer phenomenon and that most lone-wolf actors have some form of social ties, as seen with definitions accommodating affiliation ties to terrorist organizations and receiving assistance (Schuurman, et al., 2019). The question of how socially isolated lone-wolves appear to some as woefully overstated and that external social influences encourage and justify violence for political means.  This challenge influences the criteria of U.S. lone-wolve incidents under research examination as Hamm and Spaaij (2017) adopted a stringent definition of lone-wolves acting alone with no significant external help as their basis of incidents. Others, such as Simon (2011), include small groups and critical external assistance as part of his criteria.

The U.S. government has grappled with defining lone-wolf terrorism, especially in the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.  The FBI changed its definition of terrorism from one year to the next as it tried to decide if a single individual should be considered a terrorist between 1994 to 1999 (Simon, 2011). A 2009 DHS report that ‘lone wolves and small terrorist cells embracing violent rightwing extremist ideology are the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the United States (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017).’ Despite this concern, Hamm and Spaaij (2017) write that the FBI, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) do not have public reports that address the growing threat concerns about lone-wolf terrorism.  In 2019, the FBI did publish their first public assessment of lone wolves under their ‘Lone Offenders’ report that defined a lone-wolf terrorist as a primary actor that is the primary planner and attacker that may have an affiliation to a terrorist organization and received assistance (Richards, et al., 2019).  The FBI definition is slightly looser than the strict definition from Hamm and Spaaij (2017), although both agree that the attacker's act is done primarily alone (Richards, et al., 2019).  While the government has struggled to define lone-wolf terrorists until very recently to help ground the understanding and criteria of approaches to U.S. lone-wolf terrorism.

Lone Wolf Strategy

The lone-wolf terrorist, as contemporarily defined, is an individual actor who plots and carries out a terrorist attack with little to no external assistance. One of the biggest reasons this strategy exists is that it can easily avoid most existing counterterrorism methods. Shhuurman (2019) notes that lone offender attacks in the United States are more deadly, possibly due to strong U.S. counterterrorism capacity for disrupting attacks from cells and organizations.  There are similarities between lone-wolves and organized terrorist groups in terms of tactics, motivations, and objectives.  Regardless of terrorism strategy, lone-wolves are like any other terrorist that seeks to promote political or religious change through violence (Simon, 2011).  A lone-wolve ability to avoid detection and maintain animosity makes it incredibly tough to predict and prevent attacks from such actors while supporting maximum creativity and innovation that group organization would possibly restrain (Simon, 2011).  The only person concerned with execution and planning is oneself. The themes behind lone-wolf incidents are extensive from anti-government, religion, race, pro-life, anti-law enforcement, sexual orientation, and anti-capitalism and environmental rights (Richard, et al., 2019).

Assessing Effectiveness of Lone Wolf Attacks

Hamm and Spaaji (2017) point out that lone-wolf terrorism lethality has been climbing every decade since the 1990s, which is, in turn, is influencing government and societal response to such incidents.  Hamm and Spaaji (2017) point out that lone-wolf terrorism lethality has been climbing every decade since the 1990s, which is, in turn, is influencing government and societal response to such incidents.  The predominant use of firearms in U.S. lone-wolf incidents has sparked national discussions on gun control, mental health, and political discourse's civil limits (Alfaro-Gonzalez, et al., 2015; Hamm & Spaaji, 2017; Richards, et al., 2019).  69 percent of lone wolves owned legally purchased firearms utilized in their attacks and 35 percent had formal firearms training (Richards, et al., 2019).  The attraction of using guns for U.S. lone-wolf terrorist incidents is postulated in the tightening of explosives regulation in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing combined with the continued easy to obtain gun laws (Hamm & Spaaji, 2017; Simon, 2011).  As most U.S. lone-wolf incidents are being carried out with a legally purchased gun, a disturbing trend exhibited in this form of terrorism complicates potential gun law reforms that could potentially reduce lone-wolf incidents.

Gill and Corner (2016) note that there is little difference between those that plot against the general public versus high-value targets in 111 incidents; however, a significant finding was that information leakage of intent to harm greatly increased when targeting the public.  Richards (2019) points out that lone wolves tend to target low-security areas 52 percent of the time. However, Gill & Corner’s (2016) research disputes that despite targeting high-value targets, more human capital, technical expertise, and planning should require more human capital and planning since lone-wolves displayed the same traits regardless of the target selected.  The predominant targeting for American lone-wolf terrorists is federal government facilities and personnel and law enforcement personnel at around 30%  (Richards, et al., 2019; Hamm & Spaaji, 2017).  Overall, targeting selection for lone-wolves is incredibly broad that is familiar with organized terrorism to act by bombing, hijacking, assassinations, kidnappings, armed assaults, and hostage-taking.

Attraction to Lone Wolf Strategy

US homegrown terrorists come from diverse educational, socioeconomic, ethnic, and family backgrounds that defy profiling.  It is impossible to build a demographic profile on U.S. lone wolves as a vast array of factors that drive individuals to violence, making it very difficult to conduct threat analysis (Alfaro-Gonzalez, et al., 2015). Jeffery Simon (2011) defines five categories of lone-wolves: 1) secular, 2) religious, 3) single-issue (abortion, environmental), 4) criminal and 5) idiosyncratic.  There are no ideological limitations to becoming a lone-wolf terrorist, the very ease of adopting a singular actor terrorist is appealing to many. The 2019 FBI report details that U.S. lone wolves come from all backgrounds, with 75 percent having some form of college education (Richards, et al., 2019).  Disturbingly, 37 percent of lone-wolf terrorists have served in the military, particularly the army at 53 percent (Richards, et al., 2019).  An American lone-wolf terrorist can be college-educated, from a military background, a religious background, and many others.  The concern is that such a view makes the assessment of U.S. lone wolves incredibly difficult to manage because it paints that anyone can be a terrorist.

The U.S. Government's inability to define and act an incoherent matter against lone wolves provides additional attractiveness to adopting a strategy of lone-wolf terrorism. The U.S. federal government has approached lone-wolf terrorism in a scattered response, mainly to combat Islamic extremism with programs that focus on prevention and a community-based approach (Alfaro-Gonzalez, 2015).  The U.S government has no centralized task force that directly deals with lone-wolves, unlike internal efforts against organized terrorism (Alfaro-Gonzalez, 2015). The absence of centralized leadership within law enforcement has helped embolden lone-wolf terrorists to continue plotting and embracing radicalization. American lone-wolves are somewhat aware of this disconnect between government rhetoric on the threat of lone-wolf terrorism and actionable policy against lone-wolves has stumbled for the past decade (Alfaro-Gonzalez, 2015; Hamm & Spaaji, 2017).  While government ineptitude is not a primary driving factor towards attraction, it is a secondary concern that influences those that are considering adopting a lone-wolf strategy over joining a group.

Flaws of Lone Wolf Strategy

Lone-wolf terrorists are prone to mismanaging their operational security that exposes intent before an event that potentially thwarts them if acted on early.  Eighty-three percent of lone wolves exhibit previous hostile or aggressive behavior, and 96 percent produce writings or videos intended to be viewed by others (Richards, et al., 2019). Lone wolves have some level of social contact with family members or peers, in which 25 percent of the time, at least one bystander knew about research, planning, or preparation for an attack (Richards, et al., 2019).  As part of an attack, the need for publicity is challenging, keeping planning an attack a secret in about 85% of incidents (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017). Alfaro-Gonzalez (2015) analyzes that U.S. law enforcement needs to adopt more community-based approaches to defeating lone-wolves since most lone-wolves inform close relatives or friends during the radicalization process.  The difficulty of community-based policing that many bystanders in the community can be sympathetic to the lone-wolf ideology in question.  While community-based approaches is the best idea available, there is a ceiling of effectiveness if the law enforcement community cannot make inroads of trust.  The balance between needing publicity and maintaining secrecy is the main vulnerability in detecting lone-wolves early on.  More robust online surveillance and community-based efforts that can trust law enforcement agencies are the way to discover these flaws promptly.

Leveraging Internet Infrastructure in Lone Wolf Terrorism

The maturity of internet infrastructure and applications has enabled better utilization of lone-wolf terrorism strategies as the internet has become more accessible and social media prevalence enables online community creation.  Lone-wolves are becoming more innovative and creative with how to use the internet for terrorism. As seen with the 2019 Christchurch mosque, shootings showcase novel creativity in utilizing social media live feeding the incident for maximum publicity pre-attack intent (Hoffman, 2019).  Social media is creating virtual communities of hatred that have become the cornerstone for online radicalization and planning. A new generation has become comfortable with the utility of the internet, as seen with Faisal Shahzad and Major Nidel Hasan (Post, et al., 2014).  The new generation seeks belonging and significance with online communities that generate self-radicalization. Terrorist organizations find that decentralized organizations can be met through the medium of the internet as counterterrorism strategies have put immense pressure on formal organizational structure.  Radicalization and operational planning are increasingly taking place entirely online, utilizing encrypted applications or social media that challenge existing counterterrorism strategies better to avoid detection (Gartenstein-Ross & Barr, 2016).

There is a correlation between greater internet connectivity within democracies, notably with less wealthy and weak democracies, and domestic terrorism that amplify preexisting political, societal, and economic tensions (Hunter, et al., 2019). Hunter (2019) notes that more access to the internet is not the primary cause of domestic terrorism; however, greater internet access increases potential radicalization, intensify existing tensions, more opportunity to recruit, and the avenue of self-radicalization.  Digital infrastructure is more robust within democracies defined by social media and end-to-end encryption platforms. The internet challenges traditional ways of radicalization and operational planning no longer apply in a digital world where individuals and networks can gather online to conduct all their activities without physically meeting.  The freedom of information that the internet affords, while largely beneficial, has negative consequences as the primer avenue of lone-wolf radicalization in democracies.

Louis Beam’s idea to utilize the internet for radicalization, planning, and executing lone-wolf terrorists was ahead of his time.  The internet needed to become more mature, more robust, and more accessible to become the convenient platform today for lone-wolf terrorists.  The new organization model of terrorism is increasingly dominated by lone-wolf actors communicating online (Gartenstein-Ross & Barr, 2016). The maturity of the internet and social media has allowed lone-wolves to adapt to the internet as part of their strategy to achieve bigger goals (Berger, 2019). While white supremacists were the early movers and adopters of leveraging the internet to facilitate their means to an end, every lone-wolf of any ideology can take it and run with the basic playbook Louis Beam laid out nearly 30 years ago.  The United States has seen the results of Beam’s writings as religious extremists, radical environmentalists, anarchists, and more have seen the value of the internet for their purpose as much as Beam saw the internet’s potential back in 1992.

Conclusion

            American lone-wolf terrorism is a complex issue that the internet has empowered as a means to escape the purview of law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies.  While modern American lone-wolf terrorism is rooted in white supremacist groups, any ideology seeking political change within the United States has adopted the idea of leaderless resistance to carry out attacks on American soil.  As U.S. counterterrorism efforts have been increasingly successful against organized terrorism, there has also been increasing effectiveness of violent lone-wolf attacks that the U.S. government has slowly realized and act accordingly to the threat.  The significant flaw of lone wolves is their need to publicize their attacks beforehand despite wanting to keep their planning a secret, which can be the basis of effective counterterrorism efforts.  While American white supremacists were early to spot the significance of the internet's utility for their actions, their vision could not be realized until further technological advances made the internet more robust, faster, and more applications.  The internet is here to stay, and so are lone-wolves gravitating towards online communications and communities to become the latest wave of homegrown, domestic terrorists.

References

University of Maryland. (n.d.). Global Terrorism Database 1970-2019. Global Terrorism Database. https://gtd.terrorismdata.com/files/gtd-1970-2019-4/. 

Alfaro-Gonzalez, L., Barthelmes, R. J., Bartol, C., Boyden, M., Calderwood, T., Doyle, D., … Yee, K. (2015, July 27). Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism. Washington DC; Georgetown University. https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf

Berger, J. M. (2019, August 7). The Strategy of Violent White Supremacy Is Evolving. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/the-new-strategy-of-violent-white-supremacy/595648/.

Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Barr, N. (2016, December 20). The Myth of Lone-Wolf Terrorism. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2016-07-26/myth-lone-wolf-terrorism.

Gill, P., & Corner, E. (2016). Lone-Actor Terrorist Target Choice. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 34(5), 693–705. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1002/bsl.2268

Hamm, M. S., & Spaaij, R. (2017). The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism. Columbia University Press.

Hunter, L. Y., Griffith, C. E., & Warren, T. (2020). Internet connectivity and domestic terrorism in democracies. International Journal of Sociology, 50(3), 201–219. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1080/00207659.2020.1757297

Hoffman, B., Back to the Future: The Return of Violent Far-Right Terrorism in the Age of Lone Wolves. War on the Rocks. (2019, April 2). https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/back-to-the-future-the-return-of-violent-far-right-terrorism-in-the-age-of-lone-wolves/.

MacInnis, L. (2011, August 16). Obama says "lone wolf terrorist" biggest U.S. threat. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-obama-security/obama-says-lone-wolf-terrorist-biggest-u-s-threat-idUSTRE77F6XI20110816.   

Post, J. M., McGinnis, C., & Moody, K. (2014). The Changing Face of Terrorism in the 21st Century: The Communications Revolution and the Virtual Community of Hatred. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 32(3), 306–334. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1002/bsl.2123

Richards, L., Molinaro, P., Wyman, J., & Craun, S. (2019, November 13). Lone Offender Terrorism. FBI. https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/fbi-releases-lone-offender-terrorism-report-111319. 

Schuurman, B., Lindekilde, L., Malthaner, S., O'Connor, F., Gill, P., & Bouhana, N. (2019). End of the Lone Wolf: The Typology that Should Not Have Been. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 42(8), 771–778. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1419554

Simon, J. D. (2016). Lone wolf terrorism: understanding the growing threat. Prometheus Books.

Smith, L. (2021, January 26). Lone Wolves Connected Online: A History of Modern White Supremacy. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/louis-beam-white-supremacy-internet.html. 

Examining Literature on Lone Wolf Terrorism

 

Hamm, M. S., & Spaaij, R. (2017). The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism. Columbia University Press.

This book culminated years of research into lone-wolf terrorism by Hamm and Spaaij that sets out to comprehensively tackle the complexity of defining and understanding lone wolf terrorists in the United States.  The authors examine 123 cases of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States between 1940 to 2016 and set out to produce an evidence-based approach to understanding this phenomenon. Hamm and Spaaij cover the origins of radicalization, attachment to terrorist groups, enabling factors, catalysts to acting, and preventing lone-wolves.  Hamm and Spaaij are very aware of the complex definition of a lone-wolf terrorist and are forthcoming about it in discussion on counterterrorism strategies.  The research consolidated and presented in this book is highly relevant and descriptive to the lone-wolf terrorism issue in the United States.

Simon, J. D. (2016). Lone wolf terrorism: understanding the growing threat. Prometheus Books.

This book by Jeffrey Simon is one of the few books on lone-wolf terrorism, acknowledging that the study of lone-wolf terrorism is significantly understudied compared to other areas of terrorism. Simon discusses three themes: lone-wolf terrorism is changing the dynamic international terrorism, the role of technology, specifically the internet, and the creative and innovative nature afforded to lone-wolves compared to group or intergroup dynamics. The book examines previous incidents of lone-wolf attacks to identify tactics, targets, motivations, and objectives.  A particular interest of research by Simon shows that lone wolves' ability towards creativity and innovation could lead to issues with utilizing weapons of mass destruction as part of their tactics. Simon's research is timely in the study of lone-wolf terrorism in discussing weapons of mass destruction, women's potential role in lone-wolf scenarios, and counterterrorism strategies.

Martin Gallagher. (2017). The 2016 'Lone Wolf' Tsunami - Is Rapoport's 'Religious Wave' Ending? Journal of Strategic Security, 10(2), 60–76. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.10.2.1584

This article explores Rapoport's "waves of terrorism" theory and analyzes the potential fifth wave of terrorism in light of a spat of lone-wolf terrorist attacks in 2016.  Gallagher examines the parallel between current lone-wolf attacks and the anarchist wave of the 1880s.  Various events like notable terrorist groups losing physical territory, the ascendance of far-right political parties, technology, and strengthening counterterrorism strategies towards terrorist groups drive individuals to act more independently than in the recent past. The study notes the striking similarity of methodology and target selection between lone wolves and past anarchists. The research is timely in discussing the role of the internet, the role of religion and mental health as lone-wolf terrorism continues to be a significant issue. 

Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S., & Freilich, J. D. (2013). Far-Right Lone Wolf Homicides in the United States. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(12), 1005–1024. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1080/1057610X.2013.842123

This study on understanding far-right extremists under lone-wolf operations includes lone actors, lone wolves by loose association to a group, and wolf packs through the lens of homicide and if they were motived by ideology.  The authors build upon existing databases to determine whether far-right lone wolf attacks pose a growing threat to the United States security and increase attack frequency.  Their findings question existing conventional wisdom about far-right lone wolves as an increasing threat and attack frequency.  The authors admit that additional research on other groups like jihadists, far-left, eco-terrorists, and formal terrorist organizations could shed light on a more comparative approach to their study.  This research is instrumental in understanding how researchers apply different terminology to lone-wolf terrorism assessment for the United States and data on various motivations and tactics of far-right lone-wolf terrorists.

Post, J. M., McGinnis, C., & Moody, K. (2014). The Changing Face of Terrorism in the 21st Century: The Communications Revolution and the Virtual Community of Hatred. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 32(3), 306–334. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1002/bsl.2123

This article examines that the internet's role in creating and sustaining terrorism is part of the fifth wave of terrorism. The new generation seeks belonging and significance with online communities that generate self-radicalization. Terrorist organizations find that decentralized organizations can be met through the medium of the internet as counterterrorism strategies have put immense pressure on formal organizational structure.  The research notes US homegrown terrorists come from diverse educational, socioeconomic, ethnic, and family backgrounds that defy profiling.  The authors categorize US lone-wolf terrorists into four groups: glory seekers, hero worshippers, lonely romantics, and radical altruists.  This research is paramount in understanding the role of age as defined in generations embrace the internet for radicalization through various websites, forums, social media, and other internet applications. 

Hunter, L. Y., Griffith, C. E., & Warren, T. (2020). Internet connectivity and domestic terrorism in democracies. International Journal of Sociology, 50(3), 201–219. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1080/00207659.2020.1757297

This study analyzes the internet's role in an online radicalization process driven by oneself or interactions with others caused by the easy access of the internet found in democracies.  The authors examine 80 democracies to assess their hypothesis that greater internet connectivity drives domestic terrorism. The research notes that more access to the internet is not the primary cause of domestic terrorism; however, greater internet access increases potential radicalization, intensify existing tensions, more opportunity to recruit, and the avenue of self-radicalization.  This research could explain the drive of US domestic terrorism depending on wealth, rural versus urban, and overall state of health of democracy in creating or preventing lone-wolf terrorists.

Schuurman, B., Lindekilde, L., Malthaner, S., O'Connor, F., Gill, P., & Bouhana, N. (2019). End of the Lone Wolf: The Typology that Should Not Have Been. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 42(8), 771–778. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1419554

        The authors challenge the entire existing typology of lone-wolf terrorists as attackers often have interpersonal, political, or operational ties to more extensive social networks.  The research investigates lone actor radicalization from a relational perspective and finds that Anders Breivik and Ted Kaczynski's cases are the exceptions rather than the rule.  The authors point out that lone wolf isolation is woefully overstated, and those lone actors have weak or affiliative external social ties that encourage or justify the use of violence. It is noted that the actual commission of the act of violence in the confines of the lone-wolf designation.  This research is vital to set an accurate parameter of lone-wolf terrorism, the influence of online/offline social interactions in terrorist motivation, and leakage behavior by many lone-wolves challenges the many preconceptions on the topic.

Gill, P., & Corner, E. (2016). Lone-Actor Terrorist Target Choice. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 34(5), 693–705. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1002/bsl.2268

This study scrutinizes lone-wolf terrorist target selection and attacks preparation from 111 incidents to study if behavior leans to targeting members of the general public versus high-value targets (HVTs). The author's research found little difference between those that plot against the general public versus HVTs; however, a significant finding was that information leakage of intent to harm greatly increased when targeting the public.  The research looks at network, planning, antecedent, information leakage, and stressor behaviors in target selection and attack planning.  The study confounded their hypothesis that targeting HVTs would require more human capital, technical expertise, and planning since lone-wolves displayed the same traits regardless of the target selected. This research is relevant to understanding lone-wolf targeting motivations and the importance of pre-attack information leakage is to reduce the threat.

Smith, L. (2021, January 26). Lone Wolves Connected Online: A History of Modern White Supremacy. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/louis-beam-white-supremacy-internet.html.

This article details the beginnings of utilizing the internet to drive radicalization and community of white supremacy by Louis Beam. Louis Beam was part of the Ku Klux Klan back in the 1980s that path founded using the internet to spread its message online. Beam's interactions against the federal government would be written into an essay called the "Leaderless Resistance," advocating small cell organization of five or less to resist that would become known as "lone wolves."  The article notes that domestic terrorism was purposely left as a blind spot for decades as the ideas from Beam gained traction as the internet became a ground to organize and share information, much of it in plain sight. Beam's leaderless resistance idea has gained acceptance in other terrorist ideologies, which shows the continued relevance of this particular idea that has the sustained lone-wolf terrorism strategy. Smith's article shows the threat of US lone-wolf terrorism was initiated from white supremacist ideology and showcases the sustaining power of the idea to organize and act based on lone-wolves.

 

Hoffman, B., Back to the Future: The Return of Violent Far-Right Terrorism in the Age of Lone Wolves. War on the Rocks. (2019, April 2). https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/back-to-the-future-the-return-of-violent-far-right-terrorism-in-the-age-of-lone-wolves/.

Hoffman writes on the evolution of lone-wolf terrorism adaptation from Louis Beam, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Christchurch attacker.  The article notes that the American far-right is responsible for creating two significant trends in global terrorism: lone wolves and utilizing computers for radicalization, recruitment, and inspiration. Beam operated internet bulletin boards for communicating, inspiring, and circulating literature as it was the cutting-edge technology at the time.  Decades later, the Islamic State takes advantage of a more matured internet infrastructure loaded with free social media networking platforms to drive inspiration of acts of lone-wolf terrorism.  Hoffman notes that the Christchurch gunman took full advantage of modern communications to hint his manifesto on Twitter, post it in 8chan, and live stream the shooting onto the internet for millions to see in real-time.  The importance of Hoffman's analysis is that the most prominent trends in terrorism strategy, particularly modern lone-wolf terrorism, did not come from abroad but were created from within our borders. 

Alfaro-Gonzalez, L., Barthelmes, R. J., Bartol, C., Boyden, M., Calderwood, T., Doyle, D., … Yee, K. (2015, July 27). Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism. Washington DC; Georgetown University. https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf

This Georgetown University paper is a comprehensive overview of US lone-wolf terrorism that seeks to enhance existing open-source information on the subject.  The research is borrowed from Hamm and Spaaij, noting that profiling lone-wolves is largely ineffectively, showcase paths of radicalization, typology, and counterterrorism strategies.  The authors propose a new typology from all previous contemporary research divided into four groups: lone soldiers, lone vanguards, lone followers, and loners.  The paper shows the challenges of counterterrorism response that can result in blowback, explaining how the US government lacks a "whole of government" approach and offering recommendations to combat lone-wolf terrorism.  This research provides a relevant, easy-to-read analysis of what lone-wolf terrorism is, motivation, types, and how the government could counter it.

Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Barr, N. (2016, December 20). The Myth of Lone-Wolf Terrorism. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2016-07-26/myth-lone-wolf-terrorism.  

The authors dispel that lone-wolves truly act alone. They point out that quick labeling of individual attacks in Europe is dangerously overlooking the utilization of networks that most of these attacks use. The biggest problem in accurately identifying individual agency in recent terrorism incidents is that the nature of radicalization and operational planning has embraced digital communications and encryption. The authors point out that the old ways of thinking about radicalization and operational planning no longer apply in a digital world where individuals and networks can gather on social media and end-to-end encryption platforms to conduct all their activities without physically meeting.  This article does not have a particular focus on the United States; however, this article is important in acknowledging the influence of the internet blurs the line between the individual and terrorist networks as meeting barriers are lower online than trying to meet in person.