Just and Unjust Wars by Michael
Walzer is a modern exploration into military ethics and the exploration of Just
War theory about war justification and the ethical limits on the conduct of
war. The book was published in 1977 as a result of Walzer's reflection on
the Vietnam War. The 5th edition of the book was published in 2015 and
includes remarks on the Global War on Terrorism. The book is considered
standard literature on the ethics of warfare and a major contemporary statement
of just war theory.
Just war theory summary:
The purpose of the doctrine is
to ensure war is morally justifiable through a series of criteria, all of which
must be met for a war to be considered just. The criteria are split into two
groups: "right to go to war" (jus ad bellum) and "right
conduct in war" (jus in bello). The first concerns the morality of
going to war, and the second the moral conduct within war. Recently
there have been calls for the inclusion of a third category of just war theory—jus
post bellum—dealing with the morality of post-war settlement and
reconstruction.
Influential contributors to
just war theory include Aristotle and Christian philosophers Augustine of Hippo
and Thomas Aquinas. The core of just war theory before Michael Walzer's
book is derived from Thomas Aquinas as the theory was solidified through his
writings.
Discussion
We'll be kicking off our discussion of Chapter 1 from Just and Unjust Wars. At
some point tomorrow I'll throw some questions in here to get you thinking, but
otherwise feel free to bring your own questions and ideas regarding the
discussion (with relevance to the content of what we read!).
Alrighty, here are a few
questions I jotted down to get some ideas flowing, but don't feel compelled to
answer these if you don't want to. We'll say that discussion opens up around
midnight EST (GMT-5) on Sunday if that works with you all.
Q1: Recall Walzer’s assessment
of necessity, and the way in which it is employed by Athenian generals as
reflective of the realities of war in order to avoid questions of
legality/morality. Can you think of any contemporary scenarios (wars, battles,
etc.) where this idea has been invoked?
Q2: Does the Melian dialogue
imply an absence of ‘what is right’ when it comes to dealing with comparably weaker
state actors? How would this calculation change if Athens was facing a more or
less equal state actor?
Q3: Do you agree with the
characterization of Thucydides as a ‘realist’? If possible, compare with other
literature that discusses the role Thucydides plays in (or against) the realist
tradition.
Person A:
But about contemporary
scenarios, it reminded me a lot of the LIFE magazine I have which broke the
news about My Lai massacre and they invoke a lot of rhetoric that could be
applied to the Athenian generals In reality though, the notions of realism
in war and the moral judgments we make about it are something that happens in
almost every conflict
Person B:
Walzer wrote the book as part
of his grips to understanding the events of the Vietnam War.
Person A:
Yeah its 1977 right. I do
see a lot of rhetoric, especially online, of this type of equivocation of
force, this sort of "well they would do it to us if only they had the
capability", which Walzer touches on a bit.
In that Athens naturalized its
interests as some sort of "way of the world" akin to a law of nature
of humanity, in which this sort of atrocity and force is an integral part of
humanity and human struggle, which seems to be invoked most commonly in
European fascist movements. This sort of naturalization of
"struggle" and conflict is a very strict binary.
Person C:
I sense some intentional
allusions to modern imperialism too, particularly the sort of idea that if we
don’t establish supremacy someone else is going to in our stead. And that being
perceived as weak in a hostile interstate environment is basically a death
sentence
I will also say that I think
what has held pretty steady over the years is this relationship being employed
between necessity and inevitably as sorta being one and the same - the attack
of Melos being a necessary byproduct of maintaining empire obviously has a lot
of echoes to the argument of necessity that policies like containment have
at/around the point of time Walzer is writing, or really any other overarching
strategy that's defined the era of our security state at any given time.
And ofc the point I appreciate
from Walzer is that you can't really make that argument without hindsight, that
inevitability is really only visible through the eyes of a historian and not
the actors living out the history of the present moment.
Person D:
I always took this as the most
important characteristic of the Melian Dialogue. One aspect of it that has
always struck out to me (especially given its canonical place within Realism)
is that it is fundamentally a negotiation the Athenians want (at least in the
script) to talk Melos down to them, getting Melos to just cough up tribute and
concede to Athenian hegemony is the fastest and most normatively synchronous
means of resolving a situation in a manner that is conforming of the standards
expected of hegemon. As Walzer says, "There are conflicting commitments
and obligations that force us into violent antagonism even when we see the
point of one an other's positions" and you can see those conflicting
commitments and red-lines present in the text and yet undoubtedly what is also
there in the criticality of the moment is also an incredible amount of
political agency on the part of both Melos and Athens to try and satisfy those
commitments and obligations. The fact that such an outcome didn't come to pass
is what makes the dialogue such a tragic text.
Person E:
Q1. the most obvious one that
comes to my head is the use of mass aerial bombardment during wartimes but
especially WW2. The use of them is often inaccurate and bombings occur when the
ones doing the bombing are well aware that they will commit an act that will
put civilians or locations thought to be housing civilians or non-combatants at
risk. The justification is often used to either target supposed objectives
relevant to the ability of the target country to wage war or more simply to
‘bring the war home’ and create a sense of pressure by the bombings to
demoralize the civilian population in an effort to harm their psychological
willingness to continue to aid their country’s war effort. Q2. Overall no. I
feel that Athens knew what the ‘right’ course of actions was, but in an effort
to enforce their shaky control over other subjugated states in their empire,
felt that they could allow Melos to continue its independent neutrality. I feel
the same would hold even more true for an equal power actor as, at its core,
Athen’s decisions towards Melos were predicated on their uneasy feelings
regarding control of their situation. Q3. I haven’t read a lot of other
literature to compare Thucydides to a non-realist position. So I rather default
to the default position that Thucydides interpretation of the Peloponnesian War
is based on ‘realism’ although Thucydides’s own personal involvement in the war
could cloud his interpretation of events.
Person C:
Responding to: it's also worth mentioning as
well the cultural context, Melos was a former colony of Sparta and I imagine
that undoubtedly had a big role to play in why they found the idea of submission
so offensive
Ah yeah, that context does make
sense - the passage I'm recalling does make reference to an appeal to Sparta to
come to their aid but obviously never happened.
Responding to: Q1. the most obvious one that
comes to my head is the use of mass aerial bombardment during wartimes but
especially WW2. The use of them is often inaccurate and bombings occur when the
ones doing the bombing are well aware that they will commit an act that will
put civilians or locations thought to be housing civilians or non-combatants at
risk. The justification is often used to either target supposed objectives
relevant to the ability of the target country to wage war or more simply to
‘bring the war home’ and create a sense of pressure by the bombings to
demoralize the civilian population in an effort to harm their psychological
willingness to continue to aid their country’s war effort.
Yeah, I thought of the WW2
bombings like Curtis LeMay's campaign in the Pacific or even Israel's strikes
into Gaza, given the dynamics at play share a lot in common. My memory is sorta
blurring the Preface of the book and Ch 1 together but Walzer actually does
make reference to this topic when hes talking about non-state actors fighting
mixed within civilian populations/locations, partially bc it's asymmetric and
there's no way they're fighting a fair fight, and partly bc that's the truth of
it; that the actors are the civilians and the line
isn't as clear as soldier A and civilian B. Especially now so I think that
comparison is even more common than at the time Walzer was originally writing
this in 1977 (the revised version was released in late 2014/early 2015 iirc)
Person F:
Q1: My mind immediately jumped
to the nuking of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and how the present controversy or rather
a debate centers largely on what the consequences would have been after the
fact rather than on the fact we had a bomb and were itching to use it. You see
this stretched to other, non-war areas of human life though, and I can't help
but see the concept of war necessity in relation to the phrase "the ends
justify the means," so oft-invoked in defense from an atrocity.
Q2: I concur with Person E's take
here, and likewise read the same echoes of containment Person C. The idea of
hegemonic necessity is inherently predicated on devaluing the rights of others
over one's dreams of an empire. I also do not believe this implies an absence
of "what is right," either. Is tribute or destruction truly the only
two available options to Athens? Without having read the original text, it's
hard for me to judge whether it is pride or fear that lead to the eventual
Athenian position. In either case, they have lost the moral high ground. The
way to avoid the fear of a crumbling empire is to not build a fragile empire
reliant on fear in the first place.
Q3: I do not have enough learning in
realist lit or thought to take a position either way here.
Person B:
So we have to look back at how
Athenian power grew as part of the Delian League to fight off the Persian
Empire. At some point, this coalition went from defensive necessity to going on
the offensive success against the Persians to end that conflict. Persian interest
in Greek affairs did not end and was involved in supporting the Peloponnesian
League. On the longer scope of things, building alliances against Persia would
be a common theme as seen with the League of Corinth by Philip II of Macedon.
The Greek position on moving hegemonic power is tied to having enough military
and economic power to counter against another outside threat while that can
mean having a hegemonic position over other city-states. When Athens finally
lost the Peloponnesian War, Sparta became the hegemon and eventually lost that
position to Thebes by 362 BC. Eventually, this would pave the way for
Macedonian hegemony over Greece and finally produce Alexander the Great's
conquest against the waning Persian hegemon.
Thebesian hegemony was ruthlessly
crushed by the Macedonians while Thebes enlisted the help of Athens and tried
to retain control that resulted in the destruction of Thebes and most of the
city sold into slavery. Ironically, Thebes would ally against whatever
current ruling Greek hegemon just because they thought they were too powerful,
which also meant they allied with Persia once.
Person D:
I find the perspectives here
interesting especially in relation to the idea of 'Athens losing the moral high
ground' In many respects, this is the inversion of traditional realist and
constructivist (IR terms) interpretations of the Melian dialogue. The realist
argument, the one that Walzer is directly engaging with, tends to view the
Melian dialogue as evidence of the clear systemic necessity.
As Person B says, the power of
Athens as a hegemon was proportional to its power (and security) over the other
city-states of Greece; hence, what happened at Melos is no more a choice than
your need to eat (or sleep) in order to continue existing If Athens wanted to
guarantee its existence, security and autonomy it needed (within a realist
lens) to dominate others, it needed to pursue hegemony. And this is a
perspective you see the Athenians (in the writing of Thucy) raise in the
dialogue with the Melians. They aren't just approaching the conversation as 'we
want to subordinate you' they're saying 'we have to do this'.
Person B:
The other problem for the
Melian dialogue is that the siege of Melos in 416 BC. Occurred in an unease
peace from the first phase of the war that ended in 421 BC. The real
geopolitical disaster is not Melos but the huge military disaster in Sicily
shortly after the events at Melos.
Person D:
Yeah, I do think that there's
(especially when you widen your lens beyond Melos) a clear argument to be made
that Athens was basically grasping at this time to defend itself.
This is something that realists do underprivilege.
Person B:
What broke Athenian hegemony
and other states that were neutral city-states started to take side against
Athens after the Sicilian campaign disaster.
Person D:
It's why I find Person F's
analysis interesting, 'In either case, they have lost the moral high ground.
The way to avoid the fear of a crumbling empire is to not build a fragile
empire reliant on fear in the first place.' It's very close to historical
sociological readings of the conflict.
Person B:
I know a lot of the particular
snippets are still within the framing of the book on the war.
Person D:
Arguably these are even lessons
Sparta tried to learn after they sought to reconstruct the Greek system
following the conflict
Person B:
In the context of ancient
Greece, there are two lenses of hegemonic management. One is the external
hegemon of Persia and the domestic growth of a Greek hegemon. Ironically, this
attempt of trying to manage an internal hegemon would eventually give way to
the successive efforts of Macedonian hegemony at the biggest scale.
Person D:
Do you think there might be
issues trying to view Persia through a lens of 'hegemony'? This is a question
that I wanted to bring up through constructivist lenses who tend to argue that
it is crucial to look at hegemony through a cultural lens as a concept very
specific to how Greek society at an inter-political level operated. A product
of the Greek idea that the highest unit of social life was a bounded polis.
Person B:
I don't think there is an issue
because of the influence of Persia in Greek affairs until Alexander. Persian
actions in the Peloponnesian War significantly increases after the failed
Sicilian campaign and actively helping Sparta's Peloponnesian League.
A case in point is the Peace of
Antalcidas for the Corinthian War that occurred shortly the after Peloponnesian
War. While certainly not to take away the agency of domestic operations from
Greeks within Greece, but when your diplomat travels all the way to Susa to get
this treaty certainly speaks to the limit of a vacuum of Greek affairs being
strictly Greek.
Since the thing being
challenged by Persia is the concept of belonging to a singular polis. How does
one counter against this big empire that does not care about that idea? The
Dalian League and later the Athenian Empire owns its existence to the outside pressures
of Persia.
Since the very justification to
create the Dalian League and the Hellenic League gets fast-tracked by Persia.
Now obviously, you can take the alliance concept to whatever ends one wants
thinks is prudent. However, the breakdown of the Hellenic League with Sparta
and others in the Peloponnesian League was already concerned about Athenian
intentions about their power and the security needs for Asia Minor Greeks.
Bolstering Asia Minor though inadvertently powers Athens though versus Sparta's
needs. But that also goes back to the struggle of the idea of the polis and the
ebb and flow of city-state alliances in ancient Greece since that could be
determined at self-interest at the polis level and what its needs were versus
its capabilities towards various identified threats and then deciding how to
build collective capabilities with like-minded polis.
One overlooked area from this
week's question is when talking about the Melian Dialogue is about how Walzer
talks about earlier precedence on the event about Athenian policy against
Mytilene, where Athens does approve to massacre all the men in the city and
sell the women and children into slavery because they revolted. This occurred
in 428 BC as the Peloponnesian War was in its third year. However, there was an
immediate dialogue in Athens and a new order was put out that ultimately only
killed 1000 men on Mytilene.
The Melian Dialogue will become
important again when the question about neutrality is addressed in the book and
especially the modern aspects of breaking neutrality by a warring state is to
be addressed again. The question of "true neutrality" and military
necessity, in the case of the island of Melos, there could be an unwritten
portion about the military value of the natural harbor of Melos to any navy,
especially one with a campaign to Sicily under advanced planning during the
events of Melos. The route of the Athenian navy to Sicily passes Melos.
Although as Thucydides writes it, the argument being made by Athens is simply
Machiavellian in nature towards Melos with "might makes right". When
reading the History of the Peloponnesian War the Melian Conference is at the
60% point of the book. Thucydides notes that the events of Melos take place in
the 16th year of the Peloponnesian War. Immediately following the Melian
dialogue is Thucydides writing the 17th year of the war (the second phase of
the war) about the Sicilian military expedition setting off from Athens. As
Walzer writes about that there were moral considerations behind the double
thinking within Athens about what to do with revolting Mytilene, why the resort
to realism in the case of Melos? Also, I know that for modern morality sake
here, it is unacceptable to our minds about sieging a city and contemplating
killing all the military-aged males and selling everyone else into
slavery/exile; however, as Walzer points out the historical relativism of what
I would largely consider a somewhat normative accepted moral behavior between
warring actors throughout much of the ancient world.
Person F:
I did some reading last night
on political realism to come back to this because I feel as though I was
missing the lens that this was viewed through for Walzer. I do want to come
back to this statement from Walzer on necessity.
"First,
it evades the moral question of whether the preservation of the empire was
itself necessary. There were some Athenians, at least, who had doubts about
that, and more who doubted that the empire had to be a uniform system of
domination and subjection (as the policy adopted for Melos suggested).
Secondly, it exaggerates the knowledge and foresight of the generals. They are
not saying with certainty that Athens will fall unless Melos is destroyed;
their argument has to do with probabilities and risks. And such arguments are
always arguable. Would the destruction of Melos really reduce Athenian risks?
Are there alternative policies? What are the likely costs of this one? Would it
be right? What would other people think of Athens if it were carried out?"
As
we see with the failed Athenian invasion of Sicily, it is fathomable that in
making what they believe to be the "right" choice, they are stumbling
into catastrophe. As Walzer later says re: Henry V, moral decisions can be
viewed much like strategic ones; judged against their efficacy. Against this
backdrop, what strategic benefit did the destruction of Melos provide to the
Athenians? Did the destruction truly reduce Athenian risks? I too see
"necessity" as wishcasting.
Person
E:
I felt
it was seen by Athens as necessary within their logic of how they thought they
managed their empire and fought the war. Reminds me of a case I read about with
The Spanish colonial territory of New Spain. In an intro to a book about the
Utes in Colorado, this author talks in gruesome detail about how Spanish
soldiers in what is now Denver, I believe (trying to remember this from memory
as I gave the book away after college) It talks about the lengths the
victorious Spanish soldiers mutilated the bodies of a native tribe that
attacked the local fort. This was considered unique in the context of native
and Spanish violence in other parts of New Spain at the time.The author
theorized that such spectacle of violence to already dead bodies was due to the
precarious nature that these very remote outposts of Spanish control had. (IE
the local troops went out of their way to commit such acts because they felt
that grandiose displays of violence were the only way of projecting power
beyond what they were actually capable of) Insecurity bred an environment of
dehumanization, essentially.
Person B:
Walzer on necessity after that
statement also includes since the decision on Melos does not come from
"necessity of nature" as it comes from the opinions or the results of
arguments that drive decision-making. The moral point of view, which the Melian
Dialogue is pretty lacking as a general consensus, is derived from the
legitimacy of the actor. As Walzer points out that for the decision of
Mytilene, it is a calculation of moral anxiety, not political interests that
leads the Athenians to revoke their order on Mytilene versus the order on
Melos.
"Judgments
of necessity in this sense are always retrospective in character-the work of
historians, not historical actors."
Yes, one can judge moral and strategic decisions
because there is a sense of commonality throughout the ages; however, as Walzer
points out with the accounts of Agincourt, shared strategic perspective through
the ages is a bit more dubious than shared morals. Walzer brings up the
strategic accounts of Waterloo as strategists seek to find lessons learned
about matters of command responsibility, failures of discipline or control,
about strategic imperatives ignored.
"The
moral theorist is in the same position. He too must come to grips with the fact
that his rules are often violated or ignored-and with a deeper realization
that, to men at war, the rules often don't seem relevant to the extremity of
the situation. But however he does this, he does not surrender his sense of war
as a human action, purposive and premediated, for whose effects someone is
responsible. Confronted with the many crimes of a war, or with the crime of
aggressive war itself, he searches for human agents. Nor is he alone in this
search. It is one of the most important features of war, distinguishing it from
other scourges of mankind, that the men and women caught up in it are not only
victims, they are also participants."
For the Peloponnesian War, we
have Athens planning a new expedition to Sicily. I should mention there was a
previous campaign to Sicily (although not as large or with the imperialist
ambitions of the second one) in 427 BCE versus the second one in 415 BCE.
Athens and Sparta were able to negotiate some sort of uneasy peace agreement in
421 BCE; however, renewed fighting would come from respective city-states
allied to each side being egged on to do stuff to curb those powers. In 418
BCE, there was the Battle of Mantinea which the Athenian coalition forces lost,
which resulted in city-states within the Peloponnese forcibly switch sides,
reliving a lot of pressure off Sparta within its core territory. On top of
that, the Peloponnesian War that is the part of the first chronological made
history of war is actually the second Peloponnesian War and there was a
previous war on Greek hegemonic management between 460 to 445 BCE where Athens
is the rising hegemon versus Sparta's existing hegemon from fighting against
Persia. Athens does a massive expeditionary campaign to Egypt helping the
Egyptians/Libyans against Persia that eventually resulted in a massive failure,
so there is precedence some 50 years before for confidence in conducting a
Sicily campaign despite the results.
The problem with Walzer's
question on the preservation of the Athenian empire is not that people having
doubts about it but the concept and formation of hegemonic activity pre-dates
Athens' logic to pursue hegemonic activities. Activities of the Delian League
under Athens counterattacking Persia in Asia Minor brought forth the balance of
power in favor of the Greeks; however, in the aftermath of the Second
Peloponnesian War and then the Corinthian War saw Persia back in full control
of Greek Asia Minor cities in a span of about 100 years. Aggressive ambitions were
not limited to Athens as seen before and after the Second Peloponnesian War.
The starkness of the Melian
dialogue is the result of what happens to Melos is something one finds done
specifically to an enemy city in certain cases in those times and not to a
neutral city. At the end of the Second Peloponnesian War, several of
Sparta's allies call for the same thing that happened on Melos to happen to
Athens in the aftermath of the war. Sparta chooses to spare Athens, which
one can say was done on moral, realist, or both grounds. I would say it
is likely a combination of the two, although who knows what the full
calculation behind that decision was except in hindsight keeping Athens alive
did help in future hegemonic management issues
In the case of Melos, the bar
leveled to them by Athens is akin to the level of a designated enemy and not a
neutral. It is about sending a message paid in blood for non-compliance
to demands. The threat of revolts against Athens is real at the time as there
are previous instances of it in the case of Mytilene; however, the crux of the
argument for Melos' neutrality being an issue towards that end is not mentioned
in detail, so the assumptions can go in several directions on what the actual
or perceived threat picture was. Melos is overshadowed by the events in
Sicily in short order, so if Athens was successful in Sicily, would that
bolster Athens' case more or less?
The absolute value of Athens'
actions against Melos will always be valued as morally wrong, but Athens' legitimacy
in the conflict is more or less determined on maintaining its existing military
capabilities and being successful in utilizing those resources. No help
came to Melos and the more drastic decision-making by Athens' enemies and
neutral parties comes from the military defeats in Sicily. If there was
more time in between Melos and the Sicily campaign, there would be more useful
analysis in determining the factor of Melos in certain decision making if it
was recorded.
In the crux of the first part of
the book about "the moral reality of war" and against
"realism" is two parts within the first chapter (later expanded and
clarified in the next chapter):
1) There is a common experience
of moral disagreements-painful, sustained, exasperating, and endless.
Walzer points out that for all the realism, it fails to get at the realities of
that experience or to explain its character. Moral definitions are not the
issue, but descriptions and interpretations of those terms are the issues. (p.
11) This is compounded by serious difficulties of perception and
information, which gives rise to controversies over "the facts of the
case" (p. 12).
2) Our arguments and
judgment shape a "moral reality of war"-that is, all experiences of
which moral language is descriptive or within which it is necessarily employed.
(p. 15) These realities is not based on the actual activities of soldiers, but
by the opinions of mankind. This activity is fixed by the work of
philosophers, lawyers, and publicists throughout the ages. We judge if an
actor faces agony over a decision, claims a soldier or statesman as morally
ignorant or morally insensitive, or a general being deemed reckless or ignoring
danger. These actors should ought to know what is going on, worry about
them, and take the appropriate steps to avoid them.
Additionally, towards the end
of the chapter:
"The
case is the same in moral life: there really is a story to tell, a way of
talking about wars and battles that the rest of us recognize as morally
appropriate. I don't mean that particular decisions are necessarily right or
wrong, or simply right or wrong, only that there is a way of seeing the world
so that moral decision-making makes sense. The hypocrite know that this is
true, though he may actually see the world differently. Hypocrisy is rife in
wartime discourse, because it is especially important at such a time to appear
to be in the right. It is not only that the moral stakes are high; the
hypocrite may not understand that; more crucially, his actions will be judged
by other people, who are not hypocrites, and whose judgement will affect their
policies towards him. There would be no point to hypocrisy if this were not so,
just as there would be no point to lying in a world where no one told the
truth. The hypocrite presumes on the moral understanding of the rest of us, and
we have no choice, I think, except to take his assertions seriously and put
them to the test of moral realism. He pretends to think and act as the rest of
us expect him to do."
With Thucydides writing on the
Melian dialogue, that is the most pure example of realism, making statements
just about as free of the "bullshit of morality", just one side
telling another side, brutally and directly, what to do. Why Mytilene
comes up is that there was no way that the decision was made in an absence of
morality, which shows precedence of caring about morality in wartime actions
well before Melos. Also, Walzer notes that the Athenian assembly did
vigorously debate the merits of the Melos order, which challenges the prism of
pure realism. It should be noted that Thucydides was in exile during the Melian
dialogue, so it is a paraphrase as an "essence of the dialogue" as he
understood it.
