Ex parte Quirin - Opinion Text
This ruling dates back to 1942 during the height of World War II. It upheld the fact that the president could order a military tribunal to try war crimes committed by war criminals/enemy combatants instead of trying them in civilian courts. The interesting thing in this case was that one of the German saboteurs was a US citizen named Herbert Hans Haupt, who was electrocuted on August 8, 1942.
In the decision, they touch on Haupt's US citizenship with this statement:
"All except petitioner Haupt are admittedly citizens of the German Reich, with which the United States is at war. Haupt came to this country with his parents when he was five years old; it is contended that he became a citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturalization of his parents during his minority and that he has not since lost his citizenship. The Government, however, takes the position that on attaining his majority he elected to maintain German allegiance and citizenship or in any case that he has by his conduct renounced or abandoned his United States citizenship. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 , 59 S.Ct. 884, 889; United States ex rel. Rojak v. Marshall, D.C., 34 F.2d 219; United States ex rel. Scimeca v. Husband, 2 Cir., 6 F.2d 957, 958; 8 U.S.C. 801, 8 U.S. C.A. 801, and compare 8 U.S.C. 808, 8 U.S.C.A. 808. For reasons presently to be stated we do not find it necessary to resolve these contentions. [317 U.S. 1, 21]"
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, [317 U.S. 1, 38] guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. Cf. Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612, 615 , 617 S., 618. It is as an enemy belligerent that petitioner Haupt is charged with entering the United States, and unlawful belligerency is the gravamen of the offense of which he is accused.
Petitioners, and especially petitioner Haupt, stress the pronouncement of this Court in the Milligan case, 4 Wall. page 121, that the law of war 'can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed'. Elsewhere in its opinion, 4 Wall. at pages 118, 121, 122, and 131, the Court was at pains to point out that Milligan, a citizen twenty years resident in Indiana, who had never been a resident of any of the states in rebellion, was not an enemy belligerent either entitled to the status of a prisoner of war or subject to the penalties imposed upon unlawful belligerents. We construe the Court's statement as to the inapplicability of the law of war to Milligan's case as having particular reference to the facts before it. From them the Court concluded that Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law of war save as-in circumstances found not there to be present and not involved here-martial law might be constitutionally established.
So if you switch enough to one side opposing the United States, you automatically forfeit your US citizenship. These cases are pretty simple to understand their nature and context. However, the context of Ex parte Quirin is more about the constitutionality of presidential order of military tribunals, than on Haupt. Yes, this is an example of a US citizen on trial without his full rights, since the USMJ is more restrictive on due process and such. So yes, we've been dealing this subject for a long, long time.
I'll touch shortly on Ex parte Milligan since it dates to the Civil War, where the Supreme Court ruled that application of military tribunals to citizens when civilian courts are still operating is unconstitutional. It was one of the first cases right after the end of the Civil War. The Court decided the Milligan precedent did not apply here since the ruling in the Milligan case was that Lambdin Milligan was not a enemy belligerent and not entitled to the law of war, unfortunately for Haupt, he was classified as an enemy belligerent. In Milligan, there was a suspension of habeas corpus through the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act. The court ruled that the Act did not authorized military tribunals and through constitutional law, suspension of habeas corpus does not authorize military tribunals. Even martial law cannot authorize tribunals either as long as civilian courts remained open and operating unimpeded
Legal precedents on this date back to the Mexican War where spies were put to death.
"Such was the practice of our own military authorities before the adoption of the Constitution,9 and during the Mexican and Civil Wars. 10 [317 U.S. 1, 32] Paragraph 83 of General Order No. 100 of April 24, 1863, directed that: 'Scouts or single soldiers, if disguised in the dress of the country, or in the uniform of the army hostile to their own, employed in obtaining information, if found within or lurking about the lines of the captor, are treated as spies, and suffer death.'
Our Government, by thus defining lawful belligerents entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, has recognized that there is a class of unlawful belligerents not entitled to that privilege, including those who though combatants do not wear 'fixed and distinctive emblems'. And by Article 15 of the Articles of War Congress has made provision for their trial and punishment by military commission, according to 'the law of war'."
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In conclusion of this interesting road through to understand NDAA section 1031 and 1032, we can see the legal difficulties reached through the years. We still don't have a "clear" definition, and they admit so. This is why anyone linking me to bloggers or journalists cannot sway me. They rarely give a contextual view of the subject, and I've given you probably the most indepth context review you'll ever see on this subject outside of studying law and being a lawyer in case law. I went to sources to understand, not opinions, everyone has one, and so do I, but I like to be impartial in my opinion as long as possible to gain a full understanding of the facts at hand.
I believe now that in a way, encroachment on liberties have happened, and we've allowed them to happen; however, the focus on NDAA is misguided on it's focus. I type here to argue that we have subjected ourselves to encroachment through Public Law 107-40 defining the Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) or even the Patriot Act, both of which were kneejerk reactions from September 11th.
I know I've been commented on "the more you know, the more you don't". I cannot be said of this, because this is everything about NDAA down to the precedents of precedents in case law regarding detention, the use of military tribunals and case law regarding detention of US citizens. I have broken down the case laws and the NDAA Sec. 1031 and 1032 with undeniable proof of original text and videos that cannot be twisted. I know I've given huge walls of quotes as to give fuller contextual understanding of the cases I've read.
There is no hidden language anywhere that I've seen so far, and the court of expert opinion lays in lawyers versed in case law and constitutional law. I've yet to see a huge cry from this community discussing the NDAA at length, I know the ever present ACLU has though.
I state for the record that the NDAA Sec. 1031 and 1032 are vague and very arguable unconstitutional for very good reasons of gross encroachment. I will also say that people saying that 1032 does apply to Americans is wrong plain and simple, the wording expressly says that it does not apply to US citizens. As legal case law I've presented to you, the United States Government can under certain circumstances detain US citizens without charge, to be charged in military court, and it dates back to World War II.
There is a reason the why they are sections, they don't expressly overlap each other unless it says otherwise. The example is in Sec. 1032(3) under DISPOSITION UNDER LAW OF WAR referring back to Sec. 1031(c). Both sections have different COVERED PERSONS, although the one in 1032 is broader than the one in 1031. Am I not making myself sound clear that in some way this isn't some conspiracy theory?
Even then, I already broke down Covered Persons in 1031, and you pretty much have to be Mr. Haupt to be considered a terrorist and support of enemy forces. Sure, the "substantial support" wording is vague but I would say and probably win in the court of law that substantial support entails being knowledgeable in one's support of enemy forces.
The thing is to buy into a conspiracy, one has to twist words and meaning, and that means leaving out context. I've fleshed it all out, everything is laid out to bear. Case law has sided that being detained as a US citizen doesn't mean one is without legal recourse, since we do have legal precedent.
Prove me wrong here with expert opinion, because I sure as hell would welcome it. Bloggers will not suffice unless they have credentials worthy of holding such an opinion. Those preferably with case law background or law journalism would be the preferred and impartial.
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