The Yemeni Civil War: The Persian Gulf’s Humanitarian Crisis

 

Introduction

The civil war in Yemen has raged on for six years, creating one of the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis in the 21^st century.  Influenced by various historical, political, cultural, economic, and social dimensions, the Yemeni Civil War has grown into a multifaceted conflict that involves local, regional, and international actors and institutions.  The role and policies of the United States in Yemen is essential to the continued trajectory and conclusion of the civil war. The Yemeni Civil War is a perfect case study into 21^st century humanitarian disasters in conflict zones given various dimensions that influence the course of the war, the overwhelming evidence of crisis within the country, drawing in the international community and US response, and possible solutions to end the conflict.

Background

            Yemen has a troubled history that influences the unresolved nature of the Yemeni Civil War.  Since Yemeni unification in 1990, the country has never entirely erased the religious, cultural, and political differences that have resulted in armed conflict in 1994 and from 2004 to 2010 (Laub & Robinson, 2020).  Between 1990 to 2012, Yemen’s leader was Ali Abduallah Saleh, a former military officer accused by various human rights groups of running a corrupt and autocratic government (Laub & Robinson, 2020).  Saleh was subject to an overthrow during the 2011 Arab Spring by political and military rivals that failed; however, mounting international pressure forced Saleh to resign in 2012 after receiving promises of immunity from prosecution (Laub & Robinson, 2020).  Vice President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi stepped in as interim president as part of a transition deal brokered by the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the United Nations, and the United States (Laub & Robinson, 2020).  The GCC and UN-brokered National Dialogue Conference (NDC) effort failed as various Yemeni factions moved to armed conflict to seize power by 2014, unable to resolve their differences.

            According to Laub and Robinson (2020), there are several reasons for the widening rift in Yemen between 2012 to 2014 that caused the current crisis rooted in subsidy backlash, Houthi takeover, military division, and the Saudi intervention.  The Hadi administration removed fuel subsidies in July 2014 that was part of the conditions of a $550 million loan from the International Monetary Fund; however, the Houthi movement organized significant mass protests to lower fuel prices and demand a new government (Laub & Robinson, 2020).  The Houthis moved to gain control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa and northwestern Yemen in mid-September 2014 as the Houthis gave up on a UN peace deal made earlier that month, which resulted in the collapse of the Hadi government and Hadi flee into exile in Saudi Arabia (Laub & Robinson, 2020).  These moves by the Houthis cascaded into the Yemeni military, effectively fracturing it as soldiers started backing different anti-Hadi factions and furthering the divisions within Yemeni society.   The collapse of peaceful mediation by the GCC shifted the mindset of regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from mediators into active players in the Yemeni conflict through engagement in a military campaign against the Houthis to restore the Hadi government (Laub & Robinson, 2020).  The various local factors leading to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen began with the existing and widening fissures in Yemeni society that has been elusive to repair in the six-year-long war.

Factions in the Yemeni Conflict

            There are several factions on the ground in Yemen's conflict: the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), headed by President Hadi, Houthi forces, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), led by General Aidarous al Zubaidi (Sharp, 2020, p. 4).  Additionally, several regional actors assist these local actors: Saudi Arabia supporting the ROYG, Iran supporting Houthi forces, and the United Arab Emirates supporting the STC (Sharp, 2020, p. 4).  There are a few non-regional nations involved in Yemen, as well as several international organizations.  The United States is engaged in Yemen, providing material support to the Saudi-led intervention and conducting anti-terrorism operations against AQAP.  Nations such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China have provided weapons sales to various Gulf states or local proxies (Werkauser & Human Rights Watch, 2020).  International organizations such as the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, World Health Organization, and International Red Cross provide various levels of assistance to the Yemeni people.  The non-localization of the Yemeni conflict with so many states being involved in varying degrees is a significant cause of non-resolution to Yemen's war.

Current Situation of the Yemeni Civil War

            In 2020, Yemen's situation remains a place of significant violence abounding with abject poverty, poor government, a collapsed economy, and famine.  The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) considers Yemen's situation the world’s worse humanitarian crisis (OCHA, 2020).  OCHA (2020) estimates 80% of the population or 24 million people require some form of assistance.  OCHA statistics paint a grim picture of Yemen's situation by stating 20 million Yemenis are food insecure, and 7.4 million are at risk of famine (OCHA, 2020).  Additionally, about 4.3 million people have fled their homes, with 3.3 million internally displaced (OCHA, 2020). Yemen’s public sector services are significantly constrained, with 51% of health centers remain operational, and 4.7 million children require some form of educational assistance as non-payment of salaries for teachers has impacted access to education (OCHA, 2020).  In the six years of fighting, the US-based Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) estimates that about 100,000 Yemenis have died since 2015 (Sharp, 2020, pg. 4).  According to Human Rights Watch (2020), all parties in the conflict have been observed performing various human rights abuses, from unlawful airstrikes, children pressed into armed conflict, landmines, torture, and blocking and impeding humanitarian access.  Amnesty International reports that 4.5 million Yemenis have disabilities facing discrimination and humanitarian organizations have difficulty giving appropriate aid to those with disabilities (Debre, 2020). 

            One of the most significant current humanitarian issues in Yemen is access to humanitarian assistance and control of aid.  Human Rights Watch notes that all parties fighting on the ground in Yemen have done some access violations, whether from the Saudi-led coalition blockading Houthi controlled ports and airport to the Houthis restricting movements on aid in the city of Taizz (Human Rights Watch, 2020).  The port city of Hodeidah is one of the main ports for food and humanitarian assistance; the city has been a focal point of heavy fighting by the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition since 2018 (Ghobari, 2019).  Issues with aid delivery continue as the United Nations has accused the Houthis that food aid has been stolen for other purposes, such as reselling supplies in black markets (Michael, 2018).  UN employees in Yemen have faced retaliation through the form of visa revoking and being forced out of the country if they report on the Houthis, conflicted between doing the right thing and maintaining aid access (Michael, 2018). 

UN Response to the Yemeni Conflict

            The UN has been involved in Yemen for many years before the current Yemeni Civil War, being a mediator in the political transition process after President Saleh resigned in 2011 (Laub & Robinson, 2020).  Despite UN efforts to manage Yemen's political divisions, the conflict escalated into large-scale military operations throughout the country; thus, the UN’s responsibility grew further into mediation and humanitarian assistance management.  Asseburg, Lacher, and Transfeld (2018, p. 44) note the UN has a near-impossible task of mediating Yemen's political divisions caused by a national level vacuum and ever-shifting local, regional, and international alliances make conflict resolution elusive.   The UN has performed piecemeal negotiations to stem the violence; however, large-scale peace remains out of reach because of the collapse of unified Yemen.   External influences from parties like Iran or the United States help bolster local actors' perceptions of power and ability to sustain their interests, explaining that the conflict’s longevity is by design (Asseburg, Lacher, & Transfeld, 2018, p. 56).

US Policy Response and Obligations in Yemen

            The longstanding US policy in Yemen is primarily grounded around anti-terrorism efforts against AQAP and maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia.  The Yemeni Civil War has immensely complicated US anti-terrorism efforts; however, those operations have been sustained throughout the conflict (Asseburg, Lacher, & Transfeld, 2018, p. 49-50).  The US has provided weapons to the Saudi-led coalition. Some of those weapons have been reportedly turned over directly to local Yemeni forces in possible violation of the US foreign military sales agreement (Sharp, 2020, p. 11).  The US has provided over $2.4 billion in humanitarian assistance to Yemen through USAID to support the World Food Programme (WFP) operations in Yemen, with an additional $30 million in direct bilateral aid to Yemen (Sharp, 2020, p. 13).  On May 6, 2020, the US announced $225 million in continued funding to the WFP aid operation just in time as the UN announced they would have to scale down operations due to lack of funding (Pamuk, 2020).  For the most part, US policy has stayed consistent between the Obama and Trump administration in the key objectives of anti-terrorism, support of the Saudi-led coalition, and humanitarian assistance.

Conclusion

            The Yemeni Civil War should be seen as a war of significant political differences between the local Yemeni actors. Each fight is to weaken each other’s position at any negotiation table.  The UN should maintain its forefront approach to negotiating, despite the UN Security Council's bias on which councilmembers support which sides of the conflict, realizing that the bigger peace at the regional level will remain elusive for some time to come.  A reunified Yemen before is off the table, and the UN should negotiate towards a possible power-sharing agreement.  Parties in the conflict need to have some way to facilitate compromise and devalue the mechanism of returning to fighting to gain more leverage.  Figuring out local interests and resolving the array of political issues in Yemen will eventually resolve the conflict, although it will not be a quick process.

            The US should seek greater accountability of its weapons sales if it chooses to continue selling weapons to the Gulf states.  The US should provide whatever clout it can provide to back up UN-brokered negotiations to end Yemen's fighting and humanitarian crisis.  Resolution of the Yemeni Civil War in a peaceful manner that considers all local actors on the ground could alleviate other pressing policies such as combating AQAP and reducing Iranian influence in Saudi Arabia’s vicinity.  Peace in Yemen would enhance regional security and bolster critical areas of concern in US national security in the region.  Eventually, these moves would eliminate the need to provide Yemen humanitarian aid and put future economic support to enhance Yemen's economic development.

References

Human Rights Watch. (2020, January 14). World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Yemen. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/yemen.

United Nations. (2020, March 12). About OCHA Yemen. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. https://www.unocha.org/yemen/about-ocha-yemen.

Asseburg, M., Lacher, W., & Transfeld, M. (2018, October 1). Mission Impossible? German Institute for International and Security Affairs. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/mission-impossible-un-mediation-in-libya-syria-and-yemen/.

Debre, I. (2019, December 3). Amnesty: Yemen's disabled are neglected, and suffering. AP NEWS. https://apnews.com/article/d89f85756cb94af99352b1398667d1f2.

Ghobari, M. (2019, May 15). Fighting grips Yemen's Hodeidah port, complicating peace moves. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/fighting-grips-yemens-hodeidah-port-complicating-peace-moves-idUSKCN1SL09C.

Laub, Z., & Robinson, K. (2020, July 29). Backgrounder: Yemen in Crisis. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis.

Michael, M. (2018, December 31). AP Investigation: Food aid stolen as Yemen starves. AP NEWS. https://apnews.com/article/bcf4e7595b554029bcd372cb129c49ab.

Pamuk, H. (2020, May 6). US announces $225 million in emergency aid to Yemen. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-yemen-aid/u-s-announces-225-million-in-emergency-aid-to-yemen-idUSKBN22I2M8.

Sharp, J. M. (2020, April 23). Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. Washington DC; Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf.

Werkhauser, N. (2020, February 4). Germany sells arms to members of Saudi-led Yemen coalition: DW: 02.04.2020. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-sells-arms-to-members-of-saudi-led-yemen-coalition/a-53000044.  

Responsibility to Protect: Enhancing Action Measures

 

Executive Summary

            The responsibility to protect is one of the significant international human rights achievements in the 21^st century.  After the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, the international community strove to establish basic guidelines for acting against human rights violations when states failed to protect the people they rule.  In 2005, the UN World Summit finally codified the basic tenants of responsibility to protect and use force in cases of last resort.  In the 2010s, the responsibility to protect has faced a midlife crisis as multiple humanitarian crises have brought about many questions of the doctrine's usefulness. 

            The issues of the responsibility to protect are around the inconsistent application of the doctrine, varying political will on the various crisis on a case-by-case basis, brazen national self-interest overriding the doctrine’s altruistic intent, and institutional gridlock at the UN Security Council level. The responsibility to protect challenges existing norms of non-intervention, state sovereignty, and self-interest policy motives. All these issues are interconnected, resulting in improving responsibility to protect an immensely challenging prospect.

            Policymakers should embark on the necessary reforms required to improve the effectiveness of the responsibility to protect, which still serves as the best tool to address mass atrocities when states fail in their obligation to provide the necessary human security.  This report suggests three recommendations to policymakers: 1) Adopt a “prevention-reaction-rebuilding” framework. 2)  External state and international organization operations need to partner up with target state institutions, civil society, and individuals to build a “whole approach” concept to construct sufficient capacity-building and resiliency against mass atrocities. 3) Undertake reform of the UN Security Council through permanent membership expansion and veto reform to prevent self-interest interference and clarify the action guidance towards acting against genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

            Adopting these recommendations would improve cost-benefit analysis for policymakers away from the high costs of reaction towards lower costs of prevention through the “prevent-react-rebuild” framework. Additionally, it would provide for more effective, long-lasting solutions to at-risk states facing mass atrocities by relying and strengthening on locally built best practices.  Reforms to the UN Security Council would address the gridlock that has plagued states from acting to protect human lives from mass atrocities. The increasing spillover effects of these humanitarian crises threaten the international system's legitimacy and stability as these localized conflicts grow into enormous transnational security and stability issues.

           

Introduction

            In the 1990s, the international community advancements towards safeguarding human rights confronted a complicated question, what is the role and responsibilities of individual states, international organizations, and the international community towards states that fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity?  Wrangling over the debate between respecting national sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and safeguarding human rights has become one of the most critical human rights issues in the 21^st century that has formulated the doctrine known as the responsibility to protect.  Human rights violations against people within national borders have challenged the absoluteness of state sovereignty from various events from the Balkans, Rwanda, Syria, and Myanmar.  While the responsibility to protect has become an international norm, there are still significant shortfalls with the doctrine due to the proliferation of the lack of impactful action in many human rights atrocities currently underway in Libya, Syria, and Myanmar.  This paper makes recommendations towards strengthening preventive measures, capacity building, and partnering with local actors to be significant action measures that external individual states, international organizations, and the international community can implement to solidify the intent of the responsibility to protect doctrine below the threshold of forceful humanitarian intervention.

Background

The end of the Cold War redirected international efforts towards addressing human security and how violations of people's safety by internal state actions under the abuse of national sovereignty principles was an unsettling normative behavior. Two pivotal atrocities and subsequent responses conducted in the 1990s in the Balkans and Rwanda led the international community to formulate how to address the question of the use of force in humanitarian intervention and other ways and means to address systematic violations of human rights within states (United Nations, n.d.).  In 2001, an independent, Canadian-led International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) established itself to provide additional guidance on the right of humanitarian intervention via coercive measures, mainly through military force (Bellamy & Luck, 2018).  The ICISS grappled with competing humanitarian and sovereignty norms to shift the discussion from a 'right to intervene' towards 'the responsibility to protect, expanding the concept from reaction to include prevention and rebuilding in the hopes of navigating through changing norms (Bellamy & Luck, 2018).  The ICISS efforts' culminated through the 2005 UN World Summit that resulted in codifying responsibility to protect within paragraphs 138 and 139 of the UN World Summit Outcome document (A/RES/60/1) (United Nations, n.d.).

The 2005 UN World Summit helped establish two foundational idea changes to global politics: state sovereignty comes with responsibilities and global responsibility to protect people threatened by significant human rights atrocities (Thakur & Maley, 2015, p. 3). The application of the responsibility to protect received further policy formulation from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2009) that established three pillars of implementation:

1) protection responsibilities of the State

 2) international assistance and capacity-building

3) timely, decisive, and proportionate response when a state fails in its pillar one obligations

Between 2011 and 2015, the responsibility to protect doctrine has been mentioned in crises in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Islamic State in Iraq, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Sudan in Darfur and Abyei, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Cote d'Ivoire which has been accompanied by a multifaceted international response (Bellamy & Luck, 2018).  In current humanitarian crises, the responsibility to protect is not referenced to Gaza, Nigeria against Boko Haram, Myanmar, and North Korea (Bellamy & Luck, 2018).  While the responsibility to protect has become more entrenched as an international norm, it is evident that various constraints continue to plague the responsibility to protect doctrine from what accounts for adequate fulfillment of the principle.

Existing Shortfalls of Responsibility to Protect Doctrine

            While the responsibility to protect doctrine has received a sufficient normative foothold in international law; however, the doctrine has extensive shortfalls with the inconsistent application, lack of political will, self-interest interference, and institutional gridlock.  Two of the most significant responsibility to protect cases in the 2010s has been the crisis in Libya and Syria with different actions that have influenced the principle's scope and effectiveness (Plunkett, 2020, p. 783).  Bellinger (2020, p. 372) notes that the context of Western-led humanitarian intervention has been historically fraught with self-interest primarily in mind at the very expense of the people they claim to be helping. The consequences of action in Libya have been compared to the results of inaction in Syria. Both have led to long-term stability issues and continued issues around protecting people from human rights atrocities due to not considering local interests (Bellinger, 2020, p. 390). Putra and Cangara (2019, p. 63) classify this weakness as a purposeful misinterpretation of the responsibility to protect doctrine by external states to fulfill national interests only has put immense pressure on the doctrine's effectiveness.

            Another weakness to the responsibility to protect principle is the lack of accurate assessment by advocates to assess the correct cost and benefits framework beyond chronological response regarding the 2009 UN Secretary-General’s three pillars of implication (Ballamy & Luck, 2018). A significant hurdle to overcome by state decision-makers is the “prevention dilemma” since consequences of action and inaction are impossible to fully know the impact of a certain course of action that states are strongly risk-averse (Ballamy & Luck, 2018).  The world has not approached atrocities in the simultaneous metric of prevention, reaction, and rebuilding while mainly looking towards the high costs of response once atrocities are underway.  In hindsight, prevention measures are typically significantly lower in cost than atrocity response and rebuilding; however, external actors have a difficult time and interest in investing appropriately in effective case-by-case preventive measures.

            Existing institutional gridlock at the UN Security Council (UNSC) level has left the most overt application of the responsibility to protect via military force continuous at the table since the 2011 Libya intervention (Babbitt, 2017, pp. 432-433).  UNSC vetoes from Russia and China have continuously prevented military force in significant numbers in Syria, Yemen, and other places (Babbitt, 2017, p. 433). The overt attention surrounding military force potential and actual use have unhelpfully narrowed the responsibility to protect doctrine scope from its ICISS intentions towards full-spectrum prevention-reaction-rebuilding. Additionally, the institutional gridlock is directly influenced by each state’s cost-benefit analysis towards inaction and advancing their national self-interest within the UNSC.  Political opposition to approving military force in responsibility to protect has national self-interest as UNSC members have no reason to believe in altruistic reasoning to any military response part of the responsibility to protect.  The implementation of the responsibility to protect is incredibly political and delicate to all actors throughout the framework.  Despite the existing weaknesses and overt political nature surrounding responsibility to protect, the framework is still the best case for the international community to confront internally driven atrocities.

Recommendations to Strengthen Responsibility to Protect

            This report makes several recommendations to help invigorate the responsibility to protect doctrine:

•          Revisiting ICISS “prevention-reaction-rebuilding” framework for policymakers to consider a plethora of non-military means
•          External actors and international organizations rely more on capacity building approaches with the target state institutions and civil society to enhance prevention measures
•        Reform of the UN Security Council

Many of the challenges facing implementing the responsibility to protect will not disappear; however, that does not mean that doctrine is dead.  The responsibility to protect principle needs another shift that returns it towards the 2001 ICISS report that drives towards conflict prevention.  Plunkett (2020, p. 802) notes that the current interpretation of responsibility to protect is a culture of reaction instead of a culture of prevention.  Such a shift would move the responsibility to protect doctrine more firmly into the diplomatic and non-military means.  One such means of diplomacy would be mediation efforts as advocated by Babbitt (2020, p. 433) in Kenya in 2007 and Cote d’Ivoire in 2010 to prevent further escalation and atrocities.  The ICISS report focused on four prevention areas: 1) Early warning, 2. Diplomacy, 3. Ending impunity, and 4. Preventive deployments (Thakur & Maley, 2015, p. 158-159).  Returning the responsibility to protect doctrine back towards the ICISS report's intention would significantly reduce the hanging problems by employing the “last resort” measures of military force.

  McLoughlin (2016, p. 473) points out a 2013 UN report on responsibility to protect that examines risk factors and resiliency sources towards why some do not experience mass atrocities.  It is primarily acknowledged that when mass atrocities happen in states, it is the forces of the state and society within that state that construct or breakdown resiliency against atrocity. “Root causes” of mass atrocities are not significantly influenced by external actors, so external states and international organizations need to be cognizant that domestic actors have the most significant level of success and ownership to prevent crimes against humanity (McLoughlin, 2016, pp. 483-484).  Local actors' understanding of existing risk management efforts can help with the cost-benefit analysis of external actors to strengthen existing positive processes that do not require enormous resources and haphazard strategies.  Brigg (2018, pp. 846-847) that external humanitarian efforts cannot solve complex humanitarian issues in Geneva or New York but being on-the-ground to achieve effective prevention and protection efforts in target areas. Local and individual actors are still suspect to the same motivational issues that plague states in maintaining unfair political orders that reinforce atrocities. External actors need to be aware on a case-by-case basis of whether or not they should work with certain actors and their motives. Top-down external approaches to conflict resolution against mass atrocities have always been problematic, and eliminating the hierarchical approach to increase local input can drive greater local ownership to resolve human rights issues (Brigg, 2018, p. 847).  Partnering with local actors can drive effective external actor operations towards favorable outcomes in conflict resolution, which hinges on external partners' excellent understanding of local actors.

Lastly, the UN Security Council's reform is necessary to enhance the responsibility of protect doctrine to couple it to the national interest to make the international system more credible to the eyes of everyone.  While former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2003 proposed several UNSC structure reforms that stalled because of the amount of state brazenly promoting self-interest in the current permanent five structure and concerns of neo-imperialism from weak enforcement of responsibility to protect if abused (Banteka, 2015, p. 21).  One of the more comfortable measures to reforming the structure of the UNSC via procedural method is to advocate towards responsibility not to veto (Banteka, 2015, p. 7).  The idea behind the responsibility not to veto from the permanent members of the UNSC was brought up in the 2005 UN World Summit. Still, it did not get into the final document due to significant pressure from the permanent members (Banteka, 2015, p. 7).  Not using the permanent member veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity is becoming an increasingly clear need due to the knock off effects from the poor management of resolving the humanitarian crisis so far in the 21^st century.  These mass atrocities occurring within national borders in places like Syria, Libya, Sudan, Myanmar, and others have created significant spillover effects that make them transnational security issues.  The permanent members of the UNSC cannot keep sweeping the self-interest veto power indefinitely as it creating a global security issue that is way beyond the scope of responsibility to protect.  Necessary UNSC reforms would enhance both international security efforts and bolster responsibility to protect.

Conclusion

            The development of the responsibility of protect doctrine is among the most critical developments in international human rights in the 21^st century.  Despite the challenges the doctrine has faced against embedded norms of non-intervention, absolute state sovereignty, and self-interest, the responsibility to protect has established an entrenched beachhead that focuses on the common humanity and their rights regardless of borders.  Improving responsibility to protect requires acknowledging the large amount of work to make it a more attractive tool for policymakers.  Making responsibility to protect as a proper, useful tool for policymakers requires three suggestions: 1) Returning to the ICISS “prevention-reaction-rebuilding” framework away from military force options. 2. External actors need to partner effectively with target state institutions and civil society for a “whole approach” to resolving potential conflict and atrocities. 3). The structure of the UN Security Council needs to be reformed from preventing vetoing based on self-interest and enabling atrocities.  These suggestions would enhance the standing of states who advocate for these reforms and bolster the legitimacy of the international state-based system that is in dire need of new structures of accountability.   

References

United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml.

Thakur, R., & Maley, W. (Eds.). (2015). Theorising the Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139644518

Babbitt, E. F. (2017). Responsibility to Protect: Time to Reassess. Journal of Human Rights Practice, 9(3), 431–435. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1093/jhuman/hux024

Ballamy, A. J., & Luck, E. C. (2018). The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice. John Wiley & Sons.

Andika, B. & Cangara, A.R. (2019). Invoking the Responsibility to Protect: The Derogation of Its Principles and Implementation. Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, 4(3), 56–65.

Banteka, N., Dangerous Liaisons: The Responsibility to Protect and a Reform of the U.N. Security Council (May 1, 2015). Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601246

Bellinger, M. (2020). The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, and a Partial Solution. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 27(2), 371–390. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.2979/indjglolegstu.27.2.0371

Brigg, M. (2018). Humanitarian symbolic exchange: extending Responsibility to Protect through individual and local engagement. Third World Quarterly, 39(5), 838–853. https://doi-org.ezproxy.umgc.edu/10.1080/01436597.2017.1396534

Plunkett, S. F. (2020). Refocusing to Revive: The Responsibility to Protect in International Atrocity Prevention. Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law, 48(3), 773–802.

McLoughlin, S. (2016). From Reaction to Resilience in Mass Atrocity Prevention: An Analysis of the 2013 UN Report "The Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention." Global Governance, 22(4), 473

Ki-moon, B. (2009, January 12). Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General. New York; United Nations. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf